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Editors’ Introduction 
 
In 2008, the U.S. Naval War College established the Center on 
Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary 
mission is twofold: to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare 
into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and 
to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their 
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-
violent irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort 
at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned 
academics, case studies, research papers, articles, and books. Our aim is 
to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum 
that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of 
the post-9/11 world. 
It is important to note three critical caveats to this case study. 
First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author 
and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval 
War College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort was made to 
correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately 
responsible for the content of this case study.  
Third, the study questions presented in all CIWAG case studies 
are written to provoke discussion on a wide variety of topics, including 
strategic, operational, and tactical matters, as well as ethical and moral 
questions confronted by operators in the battlefield. The point is to 
make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum 
that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of 
the post-9/11 world and to show them the dilemmas that real people 
have faced in high-pressure situations.  
Finally, in addition to a range of teaching questions that are 
intended to serve as the foundation for classroom discussion, students 
conducting further research will find the extensive bibliography at the 
end of the case helpful. Compiled by the case study author and by 
CIWAG researchers at the Naval War College, the bibliography is a 
selection of the best books and articles on a range of related topics. We 
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hope you find it useful and look forward to hearing your feedback on 
the cases and suggestions for how you can contribute to CIWAG’s 
mission here at the Naval War College. 
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I. ISIS: Its Evolution and Influences 
 
No lasting resolution to the ISIS threat in Syria and Iraq will be 
feasible until viable political solutions are found for both countries. At 
the time of the writing of this case study, the U.S. has proposed no such 
solution. It has given priority to addressing the security challenge but 
has not yet settled on an overarching strategy for either country. 
Instead, the U.S. and its allies have put in place a series of military 
responses to local threats and have taken advantage of targets of 
opportunity in both countries using coalition airstrikes. In Syria, the 
U.S. has launched the occasional U.S. Special Forces mission. 
Additionally, the U.S. has provided military training and some 
equipment to the government of Iraq and has responded to requests for 
airstrikes in support of specific Iraqi military missions.  
This case study presents a net assessment of ISIS: its strengths 
and weaknesses. The conclusion will propose some recommendations 
for degrading ISIS, both militarily and ideologically. Clearly, ISIS is a 
fluid topic, subject to change; please note that information in this case 
study is current as of August 2015. 
It is beyond the scope of this case study to propose a political 
resolution to the political crises in Syria and Iraq, which have been a 
breeding ground for the group. Instead, the case study will address 
tactical recommendations for defeating ISIS at the military level and 
will suggest a strategic approach to countering the ideological 
challenge that ISIS poses to the region and beyond.  
A net assessment is descriptive, not prescriptive. Developed 
over time within the U.S. Department of Defense, a net assessment has 
been described as a practice or methodology based on asking questions 
from a variety of distinctive perspectives.
1
 It focuses on how the enemy 
                                                 
1
 The basis for the perspective on net assessment is based on Paul Bracken, 
“Net Assessment: A Practical Guide,” Parameters (spring 2006): 90-100.  
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operates and who the enemy is. It tries to understand how the enemy 
thinks about the U.S. in order to anticipate its strategy, if not its 
individual actions. To conduct a net assessment of ISIS, one needs to 
look at the strategic interactions of its component parts, its internal 
bureaucratic behavior, and the multifaceted nature of its strategy.  
 
A. What’s in a Name? From Tawhid w’ al-Jihad to ISIS 
ISIS developed its strategic approach within the modern 
jihadist tradition, which al Qaeda violently introduced to the United 
States with a series of escalating attacks culminating in the attacks of 
September 11, 2001. However, as an adaptive, learning organization, 
ISIS departed from al Qaeda’s strategy by taking advantage of its best 
thinking about jihadist lessons as codified by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, who 
is a major influence on the ISIS group’s military doctrine. In addition, 
ISIS has used a strategic plan for establishing an Islamic emirate, as 
presented in broad strokes by another al Qaeda strategist with the 
pseudonym Abu Bakr Naji. ISIS also has learned from U.S. operations, 
especially from the use of Sunni tribes during the successful “surge” in 
Iraq, which came close to destroying al Qaeda in Iraq. Lessons learned 
from U.S. operations were the basis of the successful rebirth of al 
Qaeda in Iraq under a new name and organization, now called ISIS, and 
following a new strategy. 
 
i. Al-Zarqawi: Founder, Tawhid w’ al-Jihad 
On June 8, 2006, in a remote area in the vicinity of Baquba, 
north of Baghdad, American F-16 aircraft targeted a jihadist “safe 
house” with two 500-pound bombs, causing extensive damage and 
killing its most infamous inhabitant, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. Major 
General William Caldwell, U.S. military spokesmen in Iraq, stated that 
Iraqi police arrived first on the scene, followed by U.S. Special Forces. 
The killing of the Iraqi jihadist followed intelligence information about 
the presence of one of al-Zarqawi’s known associates, Sheik Abd al-
Rahman; tips received from Iraqi residents in the surrounding area led 
to the successful operation. Troops had been on the ground watching 
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for al-Zarqawi. Major General Caldwell further stated that Rahman 
“was brought to our attention by somebody within the network of 
Zarqawi’s.” 2  In fact, the successful operation came after Jordanian 
authorities arrested members of al-Zarqawi’s network and, more 
importantly, after many Iraqi fellow insurgents had grown to loathe 
their bloody comrade-in-arms enough to act as informants. 
Al-Zarqawi’s death was the culmination of an American search 
for one of the most ruthless Salafi jihadist leaders, who had an 
American bounty on his head of $25 million, an amount equal to the 
reward offered for Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-
Zawahiri. The terrorist leader had been responsible for the killing of a 
U.N. envoy, numerous assassinations in Iraq and Jordan, countless 
killings of noncombatants, bombings of mosques and Islamic shrines, 
and shocking video beheadings. It was to be hoped that his death, 
praised by his many enemies, would lead to a weakened al Qaeda effort 
in Iraq. President George W. Bush, however, sounded a sober note 
while praising the operation: “We can expect the sectarian violence to 
continue. Yet, the ideology of terror has lost one of its most visible and 
aggressive leaders and it provides an opportunity for the new 
government to turn the tide in the country.”3 
Because so many conflicting reports exist on a man who has 
become mythic, establishing the facts of al-Zarqawi’s life is 
problematic. What is told about him, however, shows a pattern that is 
important for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the ISIS 
group: a lost young Muslim without a traditional Islamic religious 
foundation who becomes a zealous adherent of a radical jihadist group 
to find salvation through violence against the established order. In 
effect, the wayward young man becomes a fearless fighter against 
                                                 
2 “U.S. Military: Al-Zarqawi Was Alive After Bombing,” June 9, 2006, 
www.cnn.com. 
3
 “Bush: Al-Zarqawi Operation a ‘Remarkable Achievement,’” June 7, 2006, 
www.cnn.com. 
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everyone outside his group, but the very zeal that gives him his strength 
is also difficult to control and alienates the population he needs in order 
to succeed.  
The man known by the jihadi nom de guerre Abu Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi was born into poverty in the Jordanian town of Zarqa as 
Ahmad Fadil Nazal al-Khalayleh circa October 1966. Despite his 
humble circumstances, he is reported to have belonged to a prominent 
Bedouin tribe, the Bani Hassan. Like many young men who later 
become strict Salafi jihadis, al-Zarqawi in his younger years did not 
show the influence of Islamic morals. He dropped out of school, drank 
alcohol heavily, sported tattoos, and engaged in general rowdiness. He 
was a taciturn, semi-literate, petty thief and gangster.
4
 According to 
some accounts, when he was only 15, al-Zarqawi participated in the 
violent robbery of a relative’s home, resulting in that relative’s death. 
People of Zarqa remember him as a bully, a thug, and even a pimp.
5
  
Whether to escape Jordan or because of the lure of adventure, 
al-Zarqawi travelled to Afghanistan for the first time in 1989. He may 
have had a religious motivation, but the Soviet Union had withdrawn 
from Afghanistan, leaving only other Muslims to fight. One who knew 
al-Zarqawi remembers him as an utterly fearless fighter who seemed to 
put himself in the midst of the most dangerous situations:  
He wasn’t very religious during that time. In fact, 
he’d only “returned” to Islam three months before coming to 
Afghanistan. It was the Tablighi Jamaat [a proselytizing 
missionary group spread across the Muslim world] who 
convinced him—he had thirty-seven criminal cases against 
him by then—that it was time to cleanse himself.6  
                                                 
4
 Lawrence Joffe, “Obituary: Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi,” June 8, 2006, 
www.theguardian.com. 
5
 Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi,” 
The Atlantic, web ed., June 8, 2006. 
6
 Ibid. 
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Afghanistan was a formative influence for al-Zarqawi. He 
claimed that the jihadist icon Abdullah Azzam was a great influence, 
but perhaps the most important event in the formation of his ideology 
was his meeting with fellow Jordanian and one of the most influential 
ideologues of Salafi jihadism, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Al-Maqdisi 
is the author of many jihadist books and treatises, including the 
influential jihadist tract Millet Ibrahim (The Religion of Abraham). Al-
Maqdisi is important not only because he was al-Zarqawi’s 
foundational tutor but also because of his later role as a critic of his 
pupil and the ISIS group his student founded.
7
 
Al-Zarqawi remained in Afghanistan until 1992, when he 
returned to Jordan, supported intellectually by al-Maqdisi and a handful 
of other jihadists to invigorate a Jordanian jihadist group that opposed 
the monarchy and democracy while calling for the killing of Jews and 
Christians. It was here the term Tawhid (monotheism) first appeared as 
a name he favored as a sort of precursor to his group, which exploded 
onto the scene after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. At some point al-Maqdisi 
and al-Zarqawi changed the name of the group from Tawhid to Bayat 
Imam (Allegiance to the Imam). Reportedly, al-Zarqawi was jailed in 
Jordan in 1993 for weapons possession and remained incarcerated with 
al-Maqdisi and other opposition elements until a general amnesty in 
1999 freed him.  
Prison was an important school for the young jihadist. He made 
significant contacts, and became a feared leader. His jihadist group 
grew in prison and on the streets outside as a kind of religiously 
sanctioned criminal gang. In 2000 he fled again to Afghanistan, now 
the leader of Jama’at al-Tawhid w’ al-Jihad (The Group for 
Monotheism and Jihad). For the first time as a leader, he met Osama 
                                                 
7
 For the relationship between al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi, see Joas 
Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 
215-222. 
RYAN: ISIS—THE TERRORIST GROUP THAT WOULD BE A STATE 
14 
 
bin Laden, who was apparently repelled by the crude brawler, more 
talented with a knife than he was articulate. One hears that bin Laden 
did not trust al-Zarqawi because of potential infiltration of his group by 
the famed Jordanian intelligence apparatus, but hoped to use him in 
some capacity, a motivation no doubt shared by al-Zarqawi himself. 
This time in Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi ran his own training camp near 
the Iranian border, which was separate from al Qaeda although it 
received funds from bin Laden’s organization, probably on the 
recommendation of the military chief, the Egyptian Sayf al-Adel. Al-
Zarqawi did not pledge allegiance to bin Laden in Afghanistan.
8
 
With the fall of the Taliban and the dispersal of al Qaeda and 
its followers following a quick and effective campaign by U.S. forces 
and their Afghan allies, al-Zarqawi made his way to Iran before 
migrating in 2002 to the Kurdish area of Iraq. There, he teamed up with 
a small Kurdish jihadist group, Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam), and 
prepared for the expected American invasion.
9
 Now a full-blown jihadi 
leader with considerable battle experience and violent charisma, al-
Zarqawi started to build his Jama’at al-Tawhid w’ al-Jihad into the 
scourge it would become after the 2003 U.S. invasion. He targeted the 
international community, the United Nations, foreign contractors, 
American forces, and especially the Shia community. A harbinger of 
ISIS, al-Zarqawi’s group specialized in the new media with videos of 
lurid beheadings, constant Internet communications, and hyper violent 
sectarian killings featuring gruesome methods like using electric drills 
against skulls. He attacked mosques, sacred shrines, and public 
gatherings of all kinds. His message and methods such as suicide 
bombing inflated his capabilities in the imaginations of many, 
including U.S. officials. In fact, however, of the five groups of 
insurgents against American forces and the successor government to 
                                                 
8
 Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.” 
9
 Peter L. Bergen, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America 
and al Qaeda (New York: The Free Press, 2011), pp. 160-164. 
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Saddam Hussein, al-Zarqawi’s was the smallest and arguably the 
weakest. While his group was composed of some Iraqis and foreign 
fighters, the other insurgent groups included Iraqis from Saddam’s 
regime, various nationalists, tribes, and local jihadist groups. Whether 
or not the U.S. inflated al-Zarqawi’s importance, his place in the 
jihadist pantheon would be fixed by his death, and he would become 
the mythic hero for the organizations that followed in his line.
10
  
Al-Zarqawi’s group was a successful magnet for foreign jihadi 
fighters. By 2004, the insurgency in Iraq had deprived al Qaeda’s ill-
fated insurgency in Saudi Arabia (begun in 2003) of the recruits bin 
Laden expected to be available for his highest-priority effort, 
overthrowing the Saudi monarchy. Saudi jihadists and their preachers 
wanted to fight Americans, who had pulled out of the kingdom just 
weeks before the launch of al Qaeda’s insurgency. If a jihadi wanted to 
fight Americans, he went to Iraq. By 2004, the al Qaeda effort in Saudi 
Arabia was already on the road to defeat, so bin Laden and al-Zawahiri 
negotiated with al-Zarqawi the terms of affiliation with al Qaeda. The 
Tawhid group became the commander of the al Qaeda organization in 
the “land of the two rivers,” the jihadist name for Iraq. In the West, the 
organization was simply called al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Despite his 
pledge to bin Laden, al-Zarqawi was fully independent and did not 
follow direction from either bin Laden or al-Zawahiri, who became 
increasingly concerned about his indiscriminate violence against other 
Muslims as a course that would inevitably backfire. Referring to the 
videos of beheadings, al-Zawahiri presciently advised, “Among the 
things which the feelings of the Muslim population who love and 
                                                 
10
 Ahmad S. Hashim, “From al Qaeda Affiliate to the Rise of the Islamic 
Caliphate: The Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),” policy 
report, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, December 
2014.  
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support you will never find palatable are the scenes of slaughtering the 
[Muslim] hostages.”11  
It is important to view al-Zarqawi’s career as a model on 
multiple levels for the Islamic State group. Again and again, one can 
perceive the mafia-like criminal enterprise beneath the extremist 
religious pretensions. Time and again, ISIS uses religion to justify 
violent attacks against noncombatants, which most Muslims find 
inexcusable, while the apparatus for terrorism is funded by bank 
robberies, looting of artifacts, the slave market, kidnapping, and 
extortion, as well as smuggling and trafficking of all kinds, including 
petroleum, antiquities, and even people. The inventive use of social 
media, publicizing atrocities resembling what nineteenth-century 
anarchists called the “propaganda of the deed” to attract recruits to the 
movement, and the preference for the knife over the gun or sword for 
wanton executions are all traits of al-Zarqawi, a man who was more 
comfortable with the knife than with the Kalashnikov. So it should not 
be surprising that after his 2006 death in an American airstrike, his 
organization maintained many of his traits and tactics, including the 
penchant for changing the name of his organization when 
circumstances warranted.  
 
ii. From Al Qaeda in Iraq to the Islamic State in Iraq to ISIS 
In January 2006, AQI formed what was called the Mujahedeen 
Shura (advice) Council. Through it, the group hoped to draw in local 
jihadist groups, which were estranged from al-Zarqawi’s indiscriminate 
violence and violation of tribal customs. The council was not effective. 
After al-Zarqawi’s death, AQI became the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in 
mid-October, a designation that went beyond anything al Qaeda had 
claimed for itself and to which a number of local jihadist groups and 
other insurgents objected. The new name in effect declared the 
                                                 
11
 Quoted in Bergen, The Longest War, p. 167. 
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transnational Salafi jihadist group the core of a state to replace Iraq and 
demoted other factions of the insurgency to supporters of the new state.  
AQI’s leadership had become blurred even before ISI was 
declared. The new leader, whose existence was questioned by many 
observers, was Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. The more likely leader was a 
man with the nom de guerre Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. Some argued that 
both names were aliases for an Egyptian, Abu Ayyub al-Masry, who 
was close to al-Zawahiri.
12
 In any case, both Abu Omar al-Baghdadi 
and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir apparently were killed during a joint raid 
by Iraqi and American forces on April 18, 2010. The general 
decapitation operations continued across Iraq. In June 2010, the U.S. 
commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, told a Pentagon news 
conference that 80% of ISI leaders had been killed or captured.
13
  
However, at the nadir of ISI’s fortunes in June 2010, a new and 
apparently much more effective leader emerged—Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, who was soon to become known to his followers as Caliph 
Ibrahim. Unlike al-Zarqawi and al Qaeda’s top leadership, Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi was not only an experienced field jihadi but also claimed 
to have received a religious education, with the equivalent of a Ph.D. in 
Islamic law. He had been captured by American forces in 2004 and 
interned in Camp Bucca, but was released in less than a year because 
he was not considered important enough or dangerous enough to keep 
in custody. Although ISI was significantly weakened by 2010, its 
foreign leadership had been replaced with Iraqis like al-Baghdadi.  
He was born Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri near Samarra, 
Iraq, in 1971. Most of al-Baghdadi’s biography, however, should be 
seen as more propaganda than history; ISI spokesmen and clerics 
                                                 
12
 Eben Kaplan, “Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, Zarqawi’s Mysterious Successor 
(aka Abu Ayub al-Masri),” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, June 
13, 2006. 
13
 “U.S. Says 80% of al Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Removed,” June 4, 2010, 
www.bbc.co.uk. 
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carefully crafted his biography to match the preferred characteristics of 
a caliph. Thus, he was described as a descendent of the Prophet 
Mohammad, a member of the Prophet’s tribe, the Quraysh, and both a 
man of religion and a leader in battle. If propaganda and organization 
may be considered al-Baghdadi’s greatest strengths as a leader, his 
clandestine nature is no doubt his greatest survival skill. 
Al-Baghdadi and his closest circle planned a comeback 
strategy that could be rolled out as U.S. forces pulled out of combat and 
then left Iraq. In 2011, two significant events occurred: the anticipated 
withdrawal of American forces from Iraq and the unanticipated full-
scale insurrection against Bashar al-Assad in Syria in the context of the 
Arab Spring. Still nominally affiliated with al Qaeda, al-Baghdadi 
funded and sent Abu Muhammad al-Jolani into Syria in August 2011 to 
set up an organization that became operational long before it emerged 
as Jabhat al-Nusra in January 2012 in Aleppo.
14
  
Al-Jolani was a Syrian who took his time to set up a credible 
insurgent organization viewed by other rebels as both effective and 
authentically Syrian. He hid his allegiance to al Qaeda and ISI. It 
appears that he was following a strategy championed by al-Zawahiri, 
very much Mao’s or Che Guevara’s strategy of seeking local support 
for guerrilla warfare against a strong central government, perceived as 
tyrannical. This was not new to al Qaeda and belonged as much to bin 
Laden as it does to al-Zawahiri, but it was more successful than al 
Qaeda’s previous attempts in Saudi Arabia or North Africa. Moreover, 
it had the advantage initially of falling outside of American concern. 
How did all that change? 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had been part of AQI and ISI, quietly 
learning and organizing. He had likely never been important enough to 
pledge allegiance to al-Zawahiri, although his allegiance had been 
assumed and he had no reason to break with the organization. He also 
                                                 
14
 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside The Army of Terror (New 
York: Regan Arts, 2015). 
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either felt no need to ask permission or at least thought it unwise to 
when, in April 2013, he declared that he had formed the Islamic State 
of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) as a single state.  
He must have felt strongly prepared with arrangements with 
tribal groups in Iraq and the solid support he had within ISI leadership 
and rank and file. He was fulfilling not only al-Zawahiri’s call for an 
Islamic emirate in the heart of Muslim lands but also al-Zarqawi’s 
visions of the rebirth of Imad al-Din al-Zangi’s emirate. This stretched 
from Mosul to Aleppo and marked the “turning point in favor of the 
Islam” during the Second Crusade.15 In addition, as the propagandist-
in-chief, al-Baghdadi saw the utility of the popular prophesies calling 
for an Armageddon in an area north of Aleppo called Dabiq and the 
associations with the hero Saladin, who defeated the Christians and 
overturned the Shia caliphate in Egypt.  
The wildly successful al-Jolani did not want to be merged into 
the new organization and appealed to al-Zawahiri for help. In June 
2013, al-Zawahiri called for ISI to fight in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra to 
fight in Syria, without merging. After all, there was no need to merge 
when both were part of the umbrella of al Qaeda. When al-Baghdadi 
rejected al-Zawahiri’s unenforceable decision, the al Qaeda chief in 
October 2013 formally declared ISI, now ISIS, to be separate from al 
Qaeda in every sense.
16
 
ISIS, however, refused to be disbanded. Using traditional 
guerrilla tactics coupled to semi-conventional army tactics, it became 
the most successful jihadist group in Syria and set about setting up a 
proto-state with its capital in al-Raqqa. ISIS mainly avoided Syrian 
regular forces, which were slowly grinding down the Syrian insurgents 
in a costly war of attrition. ISIS fought only when it could win, and that 
was mostly against other jihadist groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra. 
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After securing its base in Syria, ISIS focused its attention on Iraq in 
June 2014.  
The newly energized group reactivated old networks within 
major cities and surrounding areas in the majority-Sunni provinces and 
proceeded with a jihadist version of blitzkrieg. The ultimate prize was 
strategically and historically significant Mosul, which fell to ISIS on 
June 10, 2014. About 800 to 1,000 ISIS fighters took the city of two 
million people when Iraqi forces comprising two divisions of 
approximately 30,000 soldiers fled after initial skirmishes.
17
 In the 
following days, ISIS went on to capture a number of strategic Sunni 
towns, such as Tikrit, and the oil refinery town of Baiji. Soon, most of 
the so-called Sunni triangle was under attack or under ISIS control.  
The lightning campaign was so successful that on the first day 
of Ramadan (June 28), the spokesman for ISIS declared that the 
Khilafah (caliphate) had been revived under the Caliph Ibrahim, the 
Commander of the Faithful, previously known as Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi.
18
 The Sykes-Picot era borders between Syria and Iraq were 
erased and the Islamic State was born, bearing the slogan “Remaining 
and Expanding.” 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. When al-Baghdadi sent Abu Muhammad al-Jolani to Syria 
and funded his startup organization, this organization initially fell 
outside of American concern. What steps might be taken to help focus 
on and prevent similar startups? 
2. How might the U.S. and its allies have better exploited the 
emerging split between al-Baghdadi (ISIS) and al-Jolani (al-Nusra)? 
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3. By killing al-Zarqawi, the U.S. severely weakened the 
capabilities of al Qaeda in Iraq, yet only a few years later, al-Baghdadi 
was able to revive AQI and radically expand its size and influence 
under the label of IS.  What factors account for this dramatic success?   
4. The “surge” in Iraq came close to destroying AQI. What 
might have been some cost-effective steps the U.S. could have taken to 
finish the job? 
5. ISIS has destroyed the Sykes-Picot border between Syria and 
Iraq, established by France and Great Britain after World War I. Can 
the borders ever be redrawn as they once were? Would a different 
configuration be achievable today? If so, what? 
 
 
B. Analytical Framework: Jihadist Strategy and Social Movement 
Theory 
There is no doubt that ISIS is heir to al Qaeda’s legacy. ISIS 
has adopted al Qaeda’s theory and doctrine of revolutionary war and 
the strategy and tactics derived from classical guerrilla warfare doctrine 
as practiced by Mao Tse Tung and other revolutionary guerrilla warfare 
theorists. In the late 1990s, a jihadist theorist who adopted the 
pseudonym Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi, and was later part of al Qaeda, 
defined revolution as: 
a comprehensive and fundamental change to the 
political order, social structure, economic ownership, and the 
standing social order. Revolution also means the attempt of a 
nongovernmental group to take control of the government in 
order to establish a new political social and economic 
structure.
19
  
Both al Qaeda and ISIS are attempting such an overthrow of 
the existing order on a global basis. Both organizations not only intend 
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to revive the ancient Islamic caliphate based on the model that existed 
in the seventh century; they also want to expand its geographic scope 
beyond all historic precedents. To answer the question of whether ISIS 
is Islamic or a perversion of Islam, one may say with confidence that 
ISIS, like al Qaeda, is pursuing a revolution within Islam first; after 
winning that war, both organizations intend to impose the results of this 
revolution on the rest of the world. As one would expect, much of what 
makes ISIS the group it has become is identical to al Qaeda as Osama 
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri conceived it.  
Like the current al Qaeda organization, ISIS is influenced by 
two major jihadist authors, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Bakr Naji. Al-
Suri is best known for his magnum opus, The Global Call to Islamic 
Resistance, which documents modern jihadist history and makes 
recommendations for the future, including a theory of small-unit and 
individual terrorism, often referred to as lone-wolf terrorism by 
Western authorities. Pseudonymous Abu Bakr Naji, also a member of 
al Qaeda, wrote a important strategic manual, The Administration of 
Savagery, that both al Qaeda and ISIS are known to use to give recruits 
a broad overview of the strategy to create the modern Islamic emirates 
that will replace existing governments. Both authors/strategists provide 
extensive materials to aid understanding the similarities and differences 
between ISIS and al Qaeda, as well as their strengths and weaknesses. 
However, if the two groups’ identities are shared to such a great extent, 
how does ISIS differ from al Qaeda?  
To begin to answer this question, it is useful to examine ISIS in 
light of the elements of a template developed by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri 
based on his exhaustive analysis of historical jihadist organizations 
from an insider’s perspective. He identified five prerequisites for a 
clandestine jihadist group:  
1. Manhaj (program or methodology): How do they apply their 
belief structure to society? What is the concept and driving ideology to 
which its members adhere?  
2. Qiyadah (leadership): Who are they? What are their 
connections to other forces hostile to democracy and the United States?  
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3. Mukhattat (strategy or road map): Are they following a 
recognizable pattern or strategic plan to achieve goals?  
4. Tamwil (funding): What are their sources? How do they 
identify the means to achieve their goals?  
5. Bay’ah (allegiance): Is their allegiance to a local or external 
individual, or to an external group?
20
  
After examining ISIS by applying an insider’s analysis, an 
outsider’s view may be obtained by using concepts derived from social 
movement theory (SMT). SMT is not a single theory; rather, it is a 
broad term used to capture the various interdisciplinary approaches 
within social science to examine why and how social movements form, 
mobilize resources, frame issues, and use networks to affect a social or 
political outcome. Much of SMT is irrelevant to the study of ISIS and 
jihadism in general. However, scholars have used specific SMT 
concepts to study Islamic activism with some success.
21
  
The three concept pairs that are most useful to the analysis of al 
Qaeda and ISIS are culture and framing; violence and contention; and 
networks and alliances. Culture and framing is most useful for analysis 
of the ISIS group’s successful propaganda and mobilization strategy. 
The use of violence in political contention is an important barometer of 
the level of violence used by ISIS to achieve its strategic goals of 
capturing and holding territory in the heart of traditional Muslim lands. 
Similarly, the distinction between networks and alliances can explain 
how ISIS and its components can form and break alliances at the 
strategic level while sharing the same networks with other groups at a 
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tactical level, whether the networks involve criminal smuggling 
enterprises or shared guerrilla operations.  
Discussion Questions 
1. How can al-Suri’s five prerequisites for a clandestine jihadist 
group—program, leadership, strategy, funding, and allegiance—be 
used to analyze Islamic State’s strengths and vulnerabilities? 
2.  Some analysts have referred to ISIS as generating a civil 
war within Islam. How does al-Qurashi’s definition of revolution 
apply?  
3. Is ISIS fomenting a civil war for leadership in a territory or 
establishing the basis for a revolution? Explain. 
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II. How ISIS Adapts al Qaeda’s Doctrine and 
Strategy of Guerrilla Warfare 
 
Most accounts of ISIS military operations in Syria and Iraq 
tend to emphasize the lurid brutality shown to its victims rather than its 
less newsworthy tactics. In this context, ISIS appears to be quite 
different from al Qaeda, at least in theory. At the same time, a careful 
examination of ISIS operations reveals that its military and political 
doctrine comes from the documented experiences of decades of jihadist 
insurrections, as interpreted by al Qaeda ideologues. ISIS learned from 
these experiences vicariously and added its own formative lessons from 
its own losses to U.S. and allied forces in Iraq to create a new approach 
to creating its so-called Islamic state and caliphate. 
 
A. Guerilla Doctrine: Lessons Learned 
In the autumn of 2001, Alan Cullison, on assignment from the 
Wall Street Journal, ventured into northern Afghanistan to write about 
the U.S.-assisted war against the Taliban. Cullison’s historic trip almost 
ended in one of the steep passes through the Hindu Kush mountain 
range. The old pickup truck the journalist had rented lost its brakes on a 
steep hill, crashed into the back of a Northern Alliance fuel truck, and 
turned over onto its side to continue its skid. The baggage slid into the 
gorge. Miraculously, none of the passengers, including “a Japanese 
journalist, two Afghan interpreters, the driver, and a shoeless boy who 
had been riding on the roof and wiping dust from the windshield,”22 
were seriously injured. One of Cullison’s interpreters, however, 
suffered a sharp blow to the ribs from what turned out to be the 
journalist’s laptop, which was destroyed in the collision.  
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Finding himself in Kabul with other journalists covering what 
was the downfall of the Taliban regime without his laptop, Cullison 
soon wearied of dictating dispatches over his satellite phone and set out 
to find a new computer in a city in which that was a rare commodity. 
After a series of inquiries, the journalist finally found an enterprising 
thief, who had been watching the al Qaeda offices. Every day, 
Mohammad Atef, al Qaeda’s military chief, entered the office building 
carrying a laptop computer. On the day before al Qaeda fled Kabul 
before the Northern Alliance and American entry into the city, the thief 
climbed over the wall surrounding the building and found the laptop 
and a desktop computer, which he took. Cullison turned the newly 
purchased computers over to U.S. authorities, who examined them 
before returning both. The laptop was curiously empty, but the desktop, 
which had belonged to Ayman al-Zawahiri, contained almost 1,000 
documents dating to as early as 1997.  
These documents included working papers, letters, business 
forms, checklists for interrogations, and a draft of al-Zawahiri’s 
unpublished writings. One of the working papers, which seemed to be 
written for the al Qaeda leader rather than by him, was an untitled 
treatise on guerrilla warfare filed under the file name ALKAER in a 
folder entitled “security.” A close examination of this untitled 
manuscript reveals that large sections are verbatim, unattributed quotes 
from the Arabic translation of American Robert Taber’s book The War 
of the Flea, thus linking the thought of al Qaeda’s top leadership to the 
study of twentieth-century left-wing guerrilla insurrections inspired by 
the writings and examples of revolutionary leaders like Mao Tse-tung, 
Che Guevara, and Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap. 
Although the manuscript found in al-Zawahiri’s computer was 
anonymous, it is most likely the work of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. The style 
of writing and presentation resembles his extensive published works; 
moreover, al-Suri taught Taber’s book in lectures on guerrilla warfare 
in Peshawar and the training camps in Afghanistan, and refers to 
Taber’s book as the best work on guerrilla warfare. Major al Qaeda 
strategists refer to it as well. The book can be found online in its Arabic 
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translation as The War of the Oppressed with al-Suri’s commentary in 
the footnotes. The word translated as “oppressed” in Arabic may also 
be translated literally as “those deemed to be weak”; thus, the war of 
the guerrilla is the war of those who are deemed to be weak, like the 
insignificant flea, but who are actually a deadly force.  
One of the strengths of Taber’s book that al-Suri seems to have 
absorbed is that it documents what makes revolutionary wars succeed 
and what makes them fail. Al-Suri spent years analyzing why jihadist 
insurrections generally failed, and his studies on Algeria and Syria, as 
well as his 2004 Call to Global Islamic Resistance, emphasize the 
importance of learning from past mistakes.
23
 Al-Suri believed that 
jihadists following the Muslim Brotherhood model had not studied 
previous examples of jihadist struggles to learn from their mistakes as 
well as their rare successes. His commentary has been influential in al 
Qaeda’s thinking from its earliest days until today, and this work can be 
considered to have guided Syrian rebels against Bashar al-Assad. Al-
Suri influenced al-Zarqawi and should be seen as a major influence on 
ISIS. 
The following description of the stages of guerrilla warfare is 
from this case study author’s translation of introductory material of the 
ALKAER document, before introducing examples from Taber’s book.  
 
First Stage: Attrition  
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The first stage of guerrilla warfare is described as composed of 
classic hit-and-run tactics used by guerrillas in insurrections, in 
preparation for the larger struggle to come. The mujahedeen’s aim here 
to weaken the central government’s hold on the periphery. The 
ALKAER document describes this stage as the equivalent of Mao’s 
metaphor of the “war of the flea” in which the weak flea, by means of 
its escalating numbers and numerous bites, first drives the powerful but 
helpless dog mad, and eventually kills it. The most important 
component of this stage, however, is political activity and propaganda 
to gain the support of the population. 
 
Second Stage: Equilibrium 
“Equilibrium” is the somewhat misleading term that describes 
the evolution of a guerrilla war (or war of resistance) into a stage in 
which the mujahedeen have acquired heavy weapons and begin to form 
more conventional or semi-conventional forces. These forces are strong 
enough to attack larger enemy forces, well-defended military 
installations to which government forces have withdrawn, and even 
cities. Meanwhile, guerrilla attacks continue as before, and 
political/propaganda operations continue or increase. 
 
Third Stage: Decision 
Stage three is characterized by a decisive battle or series of 
battles leading to the total defeat of the government and the surrender 
or flight of government forces. The ALKAER document points out that 
this stage is almost never reached because governments tend to collapse 
and their forces surrender before the decisive battle. 
In addition to presenting this brief description of the three 
stages of guerrilla warfare, the ALKAER author continues to 
demonstrate that the correct approach to this type of warfare is not 
academic and is not as tidy as the description would suggest. The 
author of the document points out that the concept may succeed in one 
land and not in another: the experience of one people with insurrection 
is not necessarily transferable to another people or another country. 
RYAN: ISIS—THE TERRORIST GROUP THAT WOULD BE A STATE 
29 
 
Geography, economics, and even the population’s susceptibility to 
ideology vary from country to country. The watchword for success is 
flexibility and the ability to adapt to local circumstances in executing a 
strategic plan, a lesson that ISIS has clearly learned and one that has 
allowed it to have more success in a short period of time.  
The influence of al Qaeda’s thinking on ISIS can be seen in the 
adaptation of Mao’s doctrine that guerrillas must be prepared to trade 
space for time. ISIS generally is ready to surrender one place in order 
to retreat and gain time to regroup, rebuild, and attack again in another 
place. This approach has the net effect of hurting its enemy’s morale 
and confidence at the same time as it builds morale among ISIS troops. 
The ALKAER document clearly states this concept: 
We need to gain time to obtain new guerrilla units 
and supporters; and we need to gain time to obtain the 
people’s trust. We need to gain time to attack the regime 
politically—politics before military as the saying goes—the 
mere existence of a guerrilla in a district in itself is a victory 
and challenges the regime. Therefore, we sacrifice space to 
obtain time.
24
 
The three-stage guerrilla war described in ALKAER shows the 
strong influence of Mao and Che Guevara.
25
 It is representative of the 
three-stage descriptions of jihadist warfare in major al Qaeda writers on 
the subject, which ISIS adapted for its strategy in Syria and Iraq. The 
importance of gaining time to produce the political outcome ISIS 
desires cannot be overstated. To cite just one circumstance, one can 
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see that ISIS generally uses its guerrilla strategy and tactics to gain time 
and break the momentum of the political military narrative against it. 
One can see this in periods when ISIS has lost significant battles like 
Kobane in Syria or Tikrit in Iraq. To counter the coalition narrative 
after losing Tikrit to the Iraqi government (aided by American air 
power), for example, ISIS moved on another axis to achieve a surprise 
success and drove Iraqi forces out of Ramadi. To achieve this, it relied 
on suicide bombers in explosive-laden trucks and small groups of 
hardened guerrilla fighters to rout an arguably more powerful force, in 
greater numbers and with superior equipment. While ISIS may not have 
expected to be able to hold Ramadi indefinitely, it changed the 
narrative of losing to coalition forces and gained time to rebuild morale 
and recruit more forces. 
To develop a greater understanding of ISIS’s doctrine for 
insurgency, it is helpful to examine another of al-Suri’s works that 
analyzes lessons he learned from the Muslim Brotherhood’s previous 
insurgency in Syria. 
 
i. Al-Suri’s Lessons Learned from Syria 
As a young man, al-Suri participated in the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s insurrection in Syria, which ended in failure in 1982. He 
established his bona fides as a jihadist strategist with his lengthy 
history of the insurgency, published in 1991 as The Islamic Jihadist 
Revolution in Syria. Part of that history was published as a separate 
manual entitled “Observations on the Jihadist Experience in Syria,”26 
which he used for training jihadists. Al-Suri detailed what he called 
seventeen bitter lessons from the failed insurgency and the one positive 
lesson from the jihadist perspective: namely, that an organization could 
mobilize a Muslim population under the Muslim banner, even against 
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great odds. However, mobilizing the population without a great deal of 
preparation was a betrayal of that population by the jihadist leadership. 
The major failure by the Muslim Brotherhood was the lack of a 
strategic concept and plan for victory against the regular and irregular 
forces of a Middle Eastern praetorian state. Not having an overarching 
concept led to all the bitter lessons that al-Suri judged to be why the 
insurrection failed. For example, without an overarching narrative and 
strategic plan, leaders cannot explain their ideology and objectives to 
their foot soldiers; they cannot transform Salafi preachers into jihadists; 
and consequently they are unable to devise a powerful internal and 
external propaganda program, without which any guerrilla war is bound 
to fail. Al-Suri also believed that a successful revolution, which is what 
Salafi jihadists seek, must learn from previous lessons.  
It is clear that both ISIS and al Qaeda have addressed these 
mistakes. Both have a strategic concept that works for them, although 
ISIS has been able to leapfrog al Qaeda in propaganda. Another 
interesting observation is that the Muslim Brotherhood was thought to 
have accepted too many recruits when the Syrian regime pressed them 
militarily, and that this allowed the regime’s intelligence services to 
infiltrate the group to gain tactical and strategic intelligence. Clearly 
both ISIS and al Qaeda have well-conceived vetting programs and keep 
their inner circles small. Furthermore, both ISIS and al Qaeda execute 
accused spies on a regular basis as a warning to others. 
A good indication of why the Free Syrian Army (FSA) has 
done relatively poorly, relative to either al Qaeda or ISIS, in the current 
uprising against the Syrian government is that they have not learned 
from al-Suri’s observations. For example, the FSA’s political 
leadership is outside the theater of operations; they depend on external 
states for support; they deal regularly with neighboring regimes; and of 
course they are devoid of any discernible ideology. Also, it is unclear 
what they would do if, contrary to expectations, they were to succeed 
against the Syrian government. Both al Qaeda and ISIS have been able 
to engage religious leaders successfully, and both have been able to 
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forge alliances with powerful local tribes, even though these alliances 
could well be fragile in the longer term. 
There are lessons outlined by al-Suri that ISIS has addressed 
better than al Qaeda. For example, al-Suri warned against engaging in a 
long war of attrition with the central government. So far, ISIS has 
generally avoided long set battles and sieges against either the Syrian or 
the Iraqi governments, whereas al Qaeda has engaged in sieges. The 
glaring exception for ISIS was their disastrous attempt to take over the 
Kurdish town of Kobane, which ended in defeat by a combination of 
Kurdish ground forces and American air strikes on January 26, 2015, 
after months of heavy fighting. On the other hand, al Qaeda initially 
had a superior capability to mount terrorist attacks outside of Syria and 
Iraq as a jihadist version of deterrence, especially against Europeans 
and the U.S., although ISIS is working to improve its capabilities in 
this area. 
The greatest failure of both ISIS and al Qaeda in their efforts in 
Syria and potentially in Iraq is the lack of unity among the various 
jihadist movements. The constant warfare among competing groups 
inevitably weakens the effort in Syria. One could argue that ISIS and al 
Qaeda engage in a periodic war of attrition against one another, which 
is greatly to the advantage of the Assad regime. Despite the ISIS 
group’s success with tribal groups, success depends on the tribes seeing 
ISIS as a better bet than either Damascus or Baghdad. Over time, tribal 
groups could see ISIS as a bad choice, but that would require more than 
ISIS blunders; it would require central governments to change their 
policies and overcome deep-rooted animus and lack of trust on the part 
of the tribes.  
Finally, despite their minor successes, neither ISIS nor al 
Qaeda has been able to win over or neutralize the Kurds in either Syria 
or Iraq. The net effect of this failure is that both jihadist groups have 
serious and able fighters threatening their flanks. The Kurds are not 
enough to overcome ISIS, but ISIS can never quite achieve its goals as 
long as determined, hostile Kurdish Peshmerga forces threaten the 
consolidation of ISIS gains. 
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ii. Al-Suri’s Call to Global Islamic Resistance Model 
The weakness was not in the methods of the 
organizations or in the organizations [themselves] in a 
general sense. On the contrary, it was the changing times and 
the givens of the new reality after 1990 that made these 
methods obsolete. I used a metaphor to clarify what I mean in 
some of [my] lectures in Afghanistan and I will return to it 
here. 
So, [imagine] you have an electric machine that is 
excellent, powerful and outstanding! But it works only on an 
old electric system of 110 volts; then, as happened in our 
countries, there is a complete changeover of electric power 
providers to 220 volts. 
Then, what happens if you were to insist on using it? 
The machine will be consumed by fire; your electric system 
will be destroyed and perhaps you will be electrocuted in the 
bargain! It goes without saying that the weakness is not with 
the machine itself, for it is flawless and perfect for its time, 
but the surrounding new circumstances made it obsolete. Its 
natural place became a museum in a corner of a vault as a 
relic from the past. And your love of it, your beautiful 
memories with it, and the fact that it is a legacy from your 
parents will not change the reality at all.
27
 
Abu Mus’ab al-Suri used the metaphor above in his last major 
work, Call to Global Islamic Resistance, less than a year before 
Pakistani authorities captured him in 2005. He intended this work to be 
his encyclopedic legacy of jihadist history and doctrine for future 
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jihadists to study. He had been a jihadist for his entire adult life, 
starting with the Muslim Brotherhood insurrection in Syria until his 
sojourn with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which 
ended in his flight from Afghanistan after the American overthrow of 
the Taliban government. He had written histories of the major jihadist 
activities, including works on Syria, Algeria, Afghanistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Yemen, and Central Asia. He became convinced that a jihadist 
insurrection based in one country, such as Egypt or Algeria, could not 
succeed after the U.S. emerged as the single global superpower after 
the fall of the Soviet Union. A jihadist insurrection based on a regional 
approach had a better chance; however, the only real hope for jihadists 
involved a globally networked effort. Al-Suri had great respect for the 
power of the modern U.S. military; he did not believe American forces, 
bolstered by their system of global alliances, could be defeated by 
traditional clandestine organizations anywhere.  
For years, Al-Suri urged jihadists to think in terms of a system 
rather than an organization. In his Call to Global Islamic Resistance, he 
described an ideal model for such a system of jihad, which he 
recognized would need to be adjusted to changing world conditions, 
just as the old single-country clandestine organization had to be 
abandoned in the face of the American-led coalition of modern allies. 
Al-Suri recommended a system in which jihadists would unite under a 
global model with three components, which he referred to as circles: 
(1) a clandestine central leadership circle; (2) a coordination circle, 
which would be a collection of “open front” regional jihadist 
insurrections; and (3) a “call” circle, composed of individual and small-
cell terrorism behind enemy lines. These enemy lines could be Europe, 
the U.S., or anywhere Muslims felt compelled to contribute to global 
resistance to the modern world order as jihadists, their only allegiance 
to the jihadist resistance. 
The system that most resembles al-Suri’s model today is al 
Qaeda’s, led by al-Suri’s old friend and leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. 
The central circle is the clandestine al Qaeda Central, based in South 
Asia. The coordination circle approximates al Qaeda’s system of 
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affiliates and associated groups. Finally, the call circle approximates 
the small cells and individual jihadists often referred to in the U.S. as 
lone-wolf terrorists. However, a “lone wolf” is not what al-Suri had in 
mind. In fact, his model was based on lone-wolf jihadists, but he 
thought that such random acts had no political or systematic effect. His 
system was meant to coordinate the activities of small-cell terrorists 
with the policies of the central circle. This coordination was to be 
carried out by what we refer to as affiliates, al-Suri’s coordination 
circle. For security reasons, the coordination circle would need to 
minimize its contact with the isolated call cells. This contact at a 
maximum would involve initial funding and training by what al-Suri 
called a builder cell. At a minimum, the call cell would have no contact 
of any kind with the rest of the circle and would fund itself and train 
itself using materials provided on the Internet. One need only think of 
the role of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in providing 
inspirational and instructional materials online for the Boston Marathon 
bombers in 2013 or, reportedly, initial funding for the Paris 
conspirators who attacked the Charlie Hebdo magazine offices on 
January 7, 2015. We should expect, however, that in many cells there 
would also be an initial facilitator who pushes individuals into 
radicalization but is not personally an attacker, and may in fact commit 
no acts that would allow criminal prosecution. 
The other system that resembles al-Suri’s model is the ISIS 
group’s self-styled caliphate. This has a semi-clandestine center 
surrounding the self-proclaimed khalifa (caliph); a series of provinces, 
similar to affiliates, in Libya, Algeria, and the Sinai, for example; and 
growing indications of the presence of lone-wolf terrorists in the U.S. 
and Europe. By using al-Suri’s template as a guide to the basic 
requirements of a jihadist group, one can see how ISIS distinguished 
itself from al Qaeda and previous groups.  
 
Discussion Questions 
1. The untitled paper found in al-Zawahiri’s laptop—most 
likely al-Suri’s work—describes three stages of guerrilla warfare. What 
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steps could a government take to keep the first stage of guerrilla 
warfare (attrition through hit-and-run tactics used by the guerrillas) 
from devolving into the second stage (equilibrium between the 
mujahedeen and government forces)? 
2. Al-Suri’s jihadist global model has three components: (1) a 
clandestine central leadership circle; (2) a coordination circle of 
regional jihadist insurrections; and (3) a “call” circle of individual and 
small-cell terrorism behind enemy lines. In what ways do al Qaeda and 
the Islamic State follow this model?   In what ways do they diverge 
from this model?  
3. Develop a counterstrategy to attack the three key 
components of al-Suri’s model outlined above. 
4. How important is the role of politics for a government facing 
guerrilla warfare? What kind of political messages have worked in the 
past? What differences, if any, should there be between political 
messaging during a conflict with jihadists versus political messaging 
against a more familiar left-wing insurgency? 
5. Setting the differences in their ideologies aside, how would 
you compare the ISIS group’s conduct of war with Mao’s wars against 
Japan and Nationalist Chinese forces, or any other left-wing 
insurrection with which you are familiar? 
 
B. Guerilla Doctrine: Al-Suri’s Template and ISIS 
The first building block of a jihadist organization is what al-
Suri, like other jihadists, calls a manhaj, which is a program, 
methodology, or guiding ideology around which the members convene. 
Al-Zawahiri has always claimed that al Qaeda follows the manhaj al-
nubuwah, or the prophetic program, which attempts to return Islam to 
the seventh-century governance of the first followers of the Prophet 
Mohammad, which the al Qaeda leader calls the “Rightly Guided 
Caliphate.” This is exactly the manhaj that ISIS claims to follow, but 
with a key difference: For al-Zawahiri, the caliphate was a goal located 
somewhere in the undefined future and al Qaeda was considered an 
organization within the larger jihadist movement; for al-Baghdadi, on 
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the other hand, the caliphate exists now, and he governs it as the Caliph 
Ibrahim.  
Al-Baghdadi emphasizes the concept of community (jama’ah) 
and claims that leadership embraces both the political and religious 
aspects of life. Al Qaeda never claimed to be a religious organization; 
its leadership claimed to combine political and military leadership in 
Osama bin Laden, and now in Ayman al-Zawahiri, as the vanguard of 
the jihadist movement. One can conclude, then, that although both 
groups use the same words for their manhaj, ISIS claims to have 
achieved al Qaeda’s goal and therefore to have supplanted al Qaeda as 
the leader—not just of the jihadist movement but of all Muslims, a 
breathtaking leap. It is difficult to see how the two groups can reunite 
without one of them abandoning its reason for existence. 
The second building block is leadership, which includes a 
paramount leader to whom its members pledge allegiance (bay’ah), as 
well as an advisory council, other councils such as military and 
religious councils, and an administrative body. Both al Qaeda and ISIS 
have clearly identified structures that resemble this description, but 
again, ISIS has insisted that it has the elements of a state with territory 
and governing departments such as a consumer affairs council, an 
education council, and so on.  
The third necessary building block is the strategic plan or 
roadmap that allows a jihadist organization to meet its offensive and 
defensive goals. Al Qaeda and ISIS share the general roadmap for 
creating an Islamic emirate, written in 2004 by al Qaeda strategist Abu 
Bakr Naji. Naji does not provide a recipe for jihadist groups to follow; 
instead he emphasizes that he is providing a strategic outline in broad 
strokes. Only a field commander can devise a strategy for a particular 
area based on geographic, demographic, and economic circumstances 
of the target area. His work, The Administration of Savagery, was used 
as a training manual for recruits, which is exactly how ISIS uses it. (See 
II.c. Guerrilla Strategy: The Administration of Savagery as 
Operational Guide.) This strategy is based on creating or taking 
advantage of areas in the countryside or a city that have fallen into 
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chaos in order to drive out government troops and impose a proto-state, 
which Naji calls the administration of savagery. In a large countryside 
such as Yemen or remote areas in Syria and Iraq, a number of such 
liberated areas may be created, expanded, and consolidated. There may 
be specific strategic plans for special circumstances as well.  
ISIS devised a plan it called Khutah Istratijiyyah li Ta’ziz al-
Mawqif al-Siyasy li ‘l-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah fi al-Iraq (Strategic Plan 
to Strengthen the Political Position of the Islamic State in Iraq) in 
2009/2010 after ISI had been decimated by a combination of attacks by 
American troops and the Iraqi tribal Awakening Councils (the Sahwah) 
during 2007-2008. Anticipating American troop withdrawals, it 
proposed to create alliances with Sunni tribes, similar to the Sahwah 
groups supported by the Americans, except this time to attack Shia 
communities in Iraq and central government forces and installations, 
which would be dominated by Shia factions. Once ISIS established 
itself in Syria, it followed this basic plan there as well. These well-
conceived strategic approaches has given both al Qaeda and ISIS a 
significant advantage over other groups in Syria. On balance, ISIS has 
been more consistent than al Qaeda and has been able to keep the 
strategic upper hand and usually, but not always, comes out the winner 
in local tactical situations. 
The fourth building block outlined by al-Suri is tamwil 
(funding). Al Qaeda and the ISIS group’s funding sources are very 
similar, although ISIS has been much more successful in self-funding. 
In the past, both groups have relied on funding from oil-rich Gulf 
countries, not directly, but from wealthy patrons. This funding has been 
replaced for the most part by criminal enterprises involving smuggling, 
human trafficking, robbing banks, and taking war booty.
28
 Perhaps 
because the ISIS group’s founder began his career as an enterprising 
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 As a result of the devastating U.S. air campaign against its central 
leadership, funding for al Qaeda occurs now in its affiliates. Al Qaeda Central 
can offer advice and guidance, but is not a source of funding. 
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criminal while al Qaeda’s founder was a businessman of sorts, ISIS has 
always had an advantage in funding from criminal enterprises like 
smuggling petroleum products. Since declaring itself to be the 
caliphate, ISIS has outstripped al Qaeda and every other jihadist group 
in funding itself exclusively through criminal enterprises, taxes, and 
fees in areas it controls.  
According to the general consensus of the Western analytical 
community, ISIS is the richest jihadist organization, with revenues of 
US$2 billion to $2.5 billion per year, according to one estimate, 
although its expenses are much higher than that.
29
 We may well assume 
that ISIS prioritizes its funding for operations and keeping tribal allies 
faithful, but it is also fair to conclude that it desperately needs large 
revenue streams to continue to operate at current levels.  
As with al Qaeda, the U.S. government, working with its allies, 
has targeted the ISIS group’s sources of revenue. For example, ISIS 
funds itself in part through the sale of antiquities of all kinds.
30
 The 
U.S. Department of State has a program to combat this source of 
funding, but it needs more support and a higher profile. Similarly, 
tightening up enforcement on smuggling, while extremely difficult, is 
not impossible and could have a significant effect on ISIS revenues. 
The most lucrative target revenue stream for ISIS in October 2014 was 
based on petroleum products. At that time, the U.S. Treasury 
Department estimated that the group’s revenue from petroleum in Syria 
and Iraq amounted to US$1 million to $2 million per day. By 
December 2014, however, the revenue had tapered off significantly 
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Its Financial Resources for War,” Terrorism Monitor 12, no. 24 (December 
19, 2014). 
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 See Amr Al-Azm, Salam Al-Kuntar, and Brian I. Daniels, “ISIS’ Antiquities 
Sideline,” New York Times, September 2, 2014; and Simon Cox, “The Men 
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because of U.S. and coalition military activities.
31
 On February 3, 2015, 
the spokesman for the Pentagon announced that “oil revenue is no 
longer the lead source of [ISIS’s] income in dollars.”32 U.S. officials 
have not specified the amount of the cut, but if the international 
coalition could cut petroleum refining and smuggling by ISIS only by 
half, we could see a drop in annual revenues to ISIS on the order of 
US$15 million to $30 million per month.  
These and other criminal activities are all known problems; 
efforts already exist and programs are in place to address them. 
Prioritizing and resourcing these programs across the spectrum of ISIS 
funding could pay large dividends. In addition, traditional 
counterinsurgency training and security assistance for local military 
and security elements in Iraq will continue to be necessary to ensure 
that local forces can eventually replace coalition forces in attacking 
revenue streams to ISIS.  
 The last of al-Suri’s building blocks for a clandestine jihadist 
organization is the pledge of allegiance (bay’ah). Both organizations 
use the bay’ah to its leaders as an organizing principle. The bay’ah is 
an ancient Islamic ritual in which an individual personally swears a 
religiously binding pledge of fealty and obedience to a Muslim leader. 
In practice, this means that individuals become members of a jihadist 
group by pledging bay’ah to its leader, whom they are now bound to 
obey. If this leader then pledges allegiance to the leader of another 
group, all the pledged members of the original group are also bound to 
follow the leader of the other group. This system of pledges of 
allegiance produces a jihadist network with centralized guidance and 
decentralized execution, which became the hallmark of al Qaeda 
operations. The ISIS group’s achievements on the battlefield and in 
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propaganda has led to greater success in acquiring such pledges of 
allegiance from individuals and groups in, for example, Egypt, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, al Qaeda still has 
strong allies and is expanding in South Asia to include India.  
Al-Suri argued that a jihadist enterprise must adapt to 
circumstances. ISIS has demonstrated that it is a learning organization. 
Al-Suri also argued for years that jihadists should work for a global 
system and not an organization (tanzim). ISIS has stated that it is not a 
tanzim but a state. Whether it can be as adaptable as a state with a 
population and territory to defend remains to be seen. Destruction of 
the ISIS group’s so-called state in Syria and Iraq likely also means 
destroying the carefully constructed ISIS system. On the other hand, al 
Qaeda currently appears to be an adaptable system composed of local 
organizations, any of which could be destroyed without destroying the 
system as a whole.  
 
Discussion Questions 
1. Using al-Suri’s analytical template for clandestine jihadist 
organizations, do you think that ISIS or al Qaeda will pose a greater 
threat to U.S. interests in the long run?  
2. With al-Suri’s template in mind, how would you recommend 
the U.S. government decrease the likelihood of a strategic alliance 
between al Qaeda elements in Syria and ISIS at some point in the 
future?  
3. The U.S. government devised a sophisticated network to 
attack funding sources for al Qaeda. What steps would you recommend 
to reduce funding for ISIS? 
4. Is ISIS more like a clandestine organization or more like a 
state? Explain. 
 
C. Guerrilla Strategy: The Administration of Savagery as 
Operational Guide 
In his influential book, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner 
(circa 2001), Ayman al-Zawahiri demonstrates that knowledge of 
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classic guerrilla warfare as practiced by ISIS and al Qaeda existed 
within the Salafi jihadist movement as early as the 1970s in Egyptian 
circles.
33
 In 1974, nine years after the publication of Robert Taber’s 
classic account of guerrilla warfare, a young man named Yahya 
Hashim came to al-Zawahiri for advice and support. Hashim was a 
deputy prosecutor who had turned against the Egyptian regime on 
religious principles and had converted to the “jihadist movement.” He 
was especially concerned about the fate of some young officers who 
were engaged in a revolt in the Military Technical College. Hashim had 
become obsessed with the issue, following details of the case in great 
detail, and beginning to consider armed confrontation with the 
Egyptian regime via guerilla warfare. He raised this idea with al-
Zawahiri, who wrote, “I did not agree and told him that the nature of 
the country was not suitable for this kind of warfare. Then I gave him a 
book about guerrilla warfare.”  
The young man apparently did not learn from al-Zawahiri’s 
book. Gripped with idea of starting a guerrilla war, he shared his plan 
with some of his brothers. His idea was to get the officers out of jail 
and begin operations in the mountains near the desert in Minya 
Governorate, on the west bank of the Nile, about 150 miles south of 
Cairo. The plan was discovered, and Hashim fled to the mountains with 
a number of military officers. The mayor of a nearby community 
became suspicious of the group and informed security officials, who 
went after the would-be guerrillas in force. When the rebel group ran 
out of ammunition, the security forces seized them and Hashim was 
killed in the action. Al-Zawahiri praises him as a hero of the jihadist 
movement against the government, but remarks that the conditions 
favoring success for guerrilla warfare simply did not exist. 
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Fursan Tahta Rayah al-Nabi (Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner), 1st ed. 
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Like al Qaeda, ISIS is known to use Abu Bakr Naji’s The 
Administration of Savagery to give new recruits the big picture about 
the strategy and tactics favored by the group they have just joined. Like 
al-Zawahiri, Naji is a proponent of the Salafi jihadist movement and 
wrote his book as a universal guide to jihadist revolution and the 
creation of an Islamic emirate. Naji presents the ideal conditions for 
jihad to define priority states and refers his readers to studies performed 
by al-Suri. He uses the term “administration of savagery” to refer to the 
goal of setting up proto-governments in liberated areas, and gives five 
ideal conditions to establish these areas: 
 Geographic depth and topography favorable to 
guerrilla operations 
 Weak government unable to control peripheries or 
densely populated internal areas 
 The nature of the people; lack of social cohesion 
allowing polarization 
 Availability of weapons distributed among the people 
 Presence of a strong and expanding jihadist movement 
and preachers 
It is clear that Nilotic Egypt is missing several of these 
characteristics. Most of the country’s population is confined to a thin 
fertile strip along the Nile. While political divisions are apparent, there 
still exists a high degree of social cohesion among the people and a 
strong identity as Egyptians. In post–Arab Spring conditions, the area is 
awash with weapons, but the strong central Egyptian government is 
able to uncover insurgent cells as they form. The Sinai, however, has 
much more favorable terrain for guerrillas and shows much less social 
cohesion. But even here, the strong central government tends to grind 
down the opposition, although it is hampered by lack of recent 
experience in counterinsurgency and a military still equipped and 
trained primarily for conventional warfare. The insurgency in the Sinai 
began as an al Qaeda enterprise calling itself Ansar Bait al-Maqdis in 
2011, which increased its activity after the fall of the Morsi government 
in 2013. It gained much more international prominence, however, after 
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the group pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi and the insurgency was 
subsumed within ISIS as an Islamic State province in the Sinai, 
sometimes referred to as Wilayat Sina. 
Abu Bakr Naji’s book proposes a three-stage guerrilla strategy 
that mirrors the three-stage strategy found on al-Zawahiri’s hard disk in 
Kabul and echoes the strategy proposed by the foremost strategists and 
practitioners of the jihadist movement. Naji’s formulation is more 
colorful:  
1. Damage and exhaustion;  
2. “Administration of savagery” in liberated areas;  
3. Creation of Islamic state by consolidating liberated areas.  
ISIS deviated from this strategy by jumping ahead to declare 
itself the caliphate for all Muslims instead of stopping at an Islamic 
emirate. This declaration increased its ability to recruit significantly 
more members, but also poses problems with other jihadist groups 
because ISIS did not seek a consensus before moving to this end state. 
When Mao Tse-tung proposed a strategy for guerrilla warfare, 
he felt compelled to justify using the word “strategy” to describe a 
tactic in warfare that was traditionally a tool of a conventional army, 
following a conventional strategy. Mao claimed, however, that when a 
territory is vast like China, guerrilla warfare “knocks at the gates of 
strategy.”34 In Mao’s terms, guerrilla warfare becomes strategic in the 
case of a vast but weak state, China, fighting a small but powerful 
country, Japan, that occupies extended areas in a protracted war. In the 
third decisive stage of Mao’s strategy, however, conventional warfare 
returns and becomes primary. 
In the concept of jihadists like ISIS, the Muslim Umma is vast 
but weak and is occupied by foreign powers or their client apostate 
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states.
35
 The three-stage strategy also requires conventional or at least 
semi-conventional forces in the third stage of consolidating liberated 
areas. However, as ISIS has implemented its war, the third stage may 
come when it “liberates” a rural area or cities such as al-Raqqa in Syria 
or Mosul in Iraq, or even sections within cities. The three-stage strategy 
is then a constant as ISIS moves from area to area, driving other forces 
out and whenever possible setting up its primitive government within 
the surrounding sea of chaos. Having no heavy industry of its own, it 
arms its semi-conventional forces from the arms left abandoned by its 
opponent. 
ISIS uses guerrilla tactics throughout its campaign in Syria and 
Iraq. It attacks weak, isolated units for the most part and avoids 
stronger forces. When it attacks an isolated army installation or other 
fortified area, it often succeeds by using suicide bombers in the initial 
assault. In video after video, ISIS shows a smiling jihadist making a 
short speech in a large truck filled with explosives; and then, 
sometimes using aerial photography, ISIS shows the progress of the 
truck against a target until it explodes. Later, it films guerrillas in small 
units moving through the installation or town mopping up local forces. 
It avoids attrition of its own forces except when it believes it can 
prevail in a high-value target such as Kobane. In areas such as 
Baghdad, ISIS uses terrorist attacks to keep its enemy occupied, in 
hopes of exhausting and demoralizing their forces. 
Mosul and al-Raqqa have become new safe havens and 
symbols of success. In both areas, but especially in Mosul, one can see 
the effects of criminal networks that apparently existed during al-
Zarqawi’s time, when his cadres extorted money and in some cases 
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acted as contract killers. ISIS today advertises its execution of freelance 
robbers and drug dealers as evidence of its intent to protect the people 
and provide security, the bare minimum requirement to set up Naji’s 
administration of savagery.  
As ISIS has consolidated its hold on cities and villages, it has 
used tribal alliances and former Baathist military to provide local 
governance and act, in Clausewitz’s term levée en masse, as an armed 
populace to oppose any encroachment by outside conventional forces 
or militias. Naji had advised jihadists with urban backgrounds to study 
tribal customs in sociological studies to allow them to deal effectively 
with tribes; and he had anticipated that some members of the central 
government could be persuaded to join the jihadist cause, much as the 
former military and political cadres of Saddam Hussein’s government 
did after the U.S. invasion. 
Naji had another important message: that ordinary Muslim 
people could not be relied on and were reluctant to join a jihadist 
operation because they were more concerned about their daily affairs or 
had been co-opted by the central government. He argued that jihadists 
needed to use polarization to mobilize a Muslim population. In his 
concept, one could polarize a community by using money to gain 
support, especially with tribes. ISIS has certainly used this tactic. But 
the main means of polarization in Syria and Iraq, where al-Zarqawi 
made great use of it, is the Sunni-Shia divide and sectarian warfare. In 
other areas such as the Sinai or Libya where this sectarian division does 
not apply, ISIS, and al Qaeda before it, uses other polarizing issues 
such as factional disputes in Libya or resentment of Sinai’s traditional 
residents against the government in Nilotic Egypt. Without polarization 
in an area, the ISIS group’s strategy would falter. The use of terrorism 
and videos of violence against enemies are powerful tools in its 
polarizing campaigns. 
The U.S. and the coalition of nations against ISIS have the 
traditional military and political tools to weaken the group by 
understanding its strategy and tactics in detail and devising means to 
counter them. The most difficult issue to address, however, is 
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polarization. The U.S. has taken the first major step to address 
polarization in Iraq by pressing for a more inclusive government, but 
Syria is still elusive. If progress in Iraq is slow and uncertain, in Syria it 
has not even begun. The air campaign is an extremely powerful (but not 
sufficient) military tool and can demonstrate that ISIS is less powerful 
than its propaganda would have us believe. However, addressing 
polarization can only occur in the context of a political solution that has 
not been described in great enough detail for Iraq and has not been 
articulated at all in Syria. The convincing description of political goals 
needs to accompany anticipated military success to avoid having any 
such success becoming temporary. 
The importance for ISIS of The Administration of Savagery, 
and the reason that this group still uses it in training new recruits and as 
a guide for regional commanders, may be because the book distills the 
essence of jihadist strategic thinking on insurgency up until its 
completion in late 2004.
36
 Its lessons are cast as universal truths based 
on what the author calls “universal laws” of war and politics. These 
laws naturally describe guerrilla doctrine and tactics that were as true 
for al Qaeda as they were for Mao, in the author’s view. The book also 
represents bin Laden’s and al-Zawahiri’s view that the United States 
can be driven out of the Middle East because it acts on self-interest, not 
principle. According to this view, if jihadists could demonstrate that the 
cost of staying in the region is too high in blood and treasure, the U.S. 
would leave the greater Middle East, and modern jihadists could then 
create a new empire using modern military tactics and an ancient plan 
of government.  
Part of the cost of staying could be addressed by guerilla 
strategy, terrorism tactics, and brutality, which ISIS has always 
emphasized. Another aspect, according to Naji, is that seizing energy 
resources in the Middle East and North Africa would give jihadists the 
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economic power to create the caliphate and cripple Western economies, 
especially the American system. Al Qaeda consistently failed to seize 
energy assets in the Arabian Peninsula; however, ISIS has made seizing 
oilfields a priority in Syria and Iraq and has succeeded to the extent that 
it strengthened its finances beyond any other jihadist group. Its threat to 
Saudi Arabia is in part to carry out bin Laden’s and al-Zawahiri’s 
greater plan. 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. Al-Suri’s definition of the ideal conditions for jihadists 
seems to describe conditions in both Syria and Iraq at the present time. 
How could the U.S. government devise a cost-effective strategy and 
tactics to weaken the conditions that help jihadists? 
2. The jihadists’ strategy is to increase the costs, in terms of 
both blood and treasure, of the U.S. presence in the region, thereby 
forcing Americans to leave the greater Middle East and allowing 
jihadists to fill the political vacuum.  In what ways can the U.S. attack 
this strategy? 
3. How does the ISIS group’s use of brutality and terrorism line 
up with other insurgencies with which you are familiar? Does the level 
of brutality matter to the outcome ISIS seeks? 
4. What steps might the U.S. take (without occupying territory) 
to help diminish sectarian polarization in Syria and Iraq?  
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III. ISIS Group’s Successful Mobilization Tactics 
 
A crucial part of the success of ISIS in Iraq and Syria is the 
group’s ability to continuously refresh its ranks of fighters despite 
heavy losses against other jihadist groups, the Kurds, the U.S.-led 
coalition air campaign, and regional governments. Recruiting foreign 
fighters to augment the ranks of local recruits is a key element of ISIS 
mobilization. By February 2015, U.S. officials estimated that as many 
as 20,000 recruits from perhaps 90 countries had joined the group.
37
 
The total ISIS fighting force from all sources in Syria and Iraq has been 
estimated to be as low as 30,000 and as high as 100,000. The estimate 
for all security forces, including police, could be as high as 200,000.
38
  
The ISIS mobilization success so far has been based on its 
ability to use social media adroitly, but behind this success is a 
carefully constructed narrative of a foundational myth, the promise of 
apocalyptic victory against all enemies in the long run, and the myth of 
a welcoming home for all Muslim recruits in the immediate term. 
Before attempting to construct a counter narrative, we must first 
understand its content. The ISIS group’s magazine Dabiq reliably 
reflects the group’s policy and propaganda and is one also of the most 
accessible vehicles for its messages. Examining ISIS media content, 
especially Dabiq, reveals its key messages and its potential target 
audiences, the “what” of its mobilization effort.  
In addition, selected Social Movement Theory concepts, best 
known for use in analyzing political movements in Western societies, 
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provide analysts with tools to understand “how” ISIS mobilizes support 
for its political and military program.  
 
A. Communication Strategy 
The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue 
to intensify—by Allah’s permission—until it burns the 
crusader Armies in Dabiq.  
ISIS has attributed this inspirational saying to its founder Abu 
Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, and it appears in every issue of the magazine 
Dabiq. Dabiq’s first issue explains that its name comes from the place 
name of an area in the northern countryside of Aleppo, which was 
mentioned in a hadith (a reported saying of the Prophet Muhammad): 
“The [last] Hour will not be established until the Romans land at al-
A’maq or Dabiq. Then an army from al-Madinah of the best people on 
the earth at that time will leave for them.” Dabiq continues the hadith 
as it describes an epic battle called “Malahim” in Arabic and 
“Armageddon” in English. The battle will be between the Muslim 
forces led by the Mahdi, but it will not occur until the Prophet Isa 
(Jesus) descends on Damascus to confront a demonic “deceiver” who is 
leading the people astray. His appearance signals the beginning of the 
end times, which open with an epic battle in which Muslims triumph 
over Christian forces and culminate in the glorious end times, which 
represent not necessarily an end but the beginning of an indefinite 
period during which the entire world will be Muslim.
39
 
This story used by ISIS is very old and is at the heart of 
popular Muslim Apocalyptic tradition. Scholars sometimes refer to this 
tradition as the A’maq cycle,40  after a series of valleys in northern 
Syria. Dabiq is now a small town of approximately 3,000 people, but 
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 The story of Dabiq appears in greater detail in Dabiq: The Return of 
Khilafah 1 (June-July 2014). 
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 For an analysis of the ancient A’maq cycle, see David Cook, Studies in 
Muslim Apocalyptic (Princeton: Darwin Press, 2002), pp. 49-54. 
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some believe it will be the scene of the ultimate confrontation between 
Muslims and Christians before the last Hour. This imaginative setting 
is romantic and open to interpretation. Numerous books have been 
written about the signs of the end times and are best sellers in some 
parts of the Middle East.  
ISIS has chosen a tradition that may be found in one of the 
major collections of hadiths, the Sahih Muslim.
41
 Like all sibylline 
utterances, its interpretation is malleable and may fit a variety of 
circumstances. For example, Western troops landing in Syria would 
allow ISIS to call for jihad based on a hadith that anyone with access to 
the Internet or Islamic books could find. The hadith’s interpretation 
connects the lands stretching from the city of Medina in Saudi Arabia 
in the south, through Iraq and Syria, to the borders of Turkey in the 
north. Other traditions connect this area in imagination to the black 
banners of Khorasan and the founder of ISIS, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, 
who came from Afghanistan (Khorasan) through Iran to Iraq, to found 
a proto-state that would stretch from to Iraq to Syria. To a new convert 
to Islam, these founding myths may be embellished to give a romantic 
purpose and meaning to a life full of struggles, which like all romantic 
quests, is full of suffering before the goal is reached. 
Al-Suri in his Call to Global Islamic Resistance cemented this 
romantic quest to the jihadist tradition side by side with his military 
theories of jihad, devoting the end of his long book to a catalog and 
analysis of apocalyptic hadiths.
42
 While some of these dealt with the 
black banner of Khorasan and the army of jihadists led by the Mahdi 
flooding out of the east to conquer all before them before taking 
Jerusalem, and were featured in some of al Qaeda’s recruitment efforts, 
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 The hadith cited by ISIS may be found in the standard compilation of hadith, 
the Sahih Muslim, chapter 40, no. 6924. 
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 For an analysis and references to the apocalyptic tradition in al-Suri’s work, 
see Jean-Pierre Filiu, Apocalypse in Islam, trans. M.B. DeBevoise (Berkeley: 
University of California Press 2011), pp. 184-193. 
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the apocalyptic tradition was never in the forefront for Osama bin 
Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Now, however, ISIS is embracing it in 
a powerful message to its potential recruits wherever they are. 
 
i. ISIS and the Apocalypse 
If the apocalyptic material is ancient, the ISIS group’s method 
of delivering it is thoroughly modern and shaped to make the message 
suit the group’s policies and recruitment efforts. ISIS has excelled in 
videos and glossy magazines with high production values, including 
professional editing of videos and high-resolution cameras for still 
shots. If the message is 80 percent of the struggle, it should not be 
surprising that ISIS takes great care in coordinating its messages and 
overlapping methods of delivery. The use of social media ensures that 
target audiences will be reached by a method that suits their 
circumstances. If a target population does not have ready access to 
computers, content targeted at smartphones offers an alternative. Where 
Facebook is popular, that is the chosen platform for messaging. If the 
smartphone is the preferred device, as it is with younger audiences, 
especially for recruitment, Twitter and even personal messaging are the 
delivery of choice. In short, all methods of delivery are available for 
general propaganda. 
For example, the announcement of the “return” of the caliphate 
was handled in very carefully orchestrated fashion, including multiple 
languages and all available electronic forums. Online, one could read 
the announcement of the caliphate and its new caliph delivered by the 
ISIS spokesman; and then on popular commercial video platforms, one 
could watch a video of the inaugural speech by the new self-styled 
caliph in the historic mosque in Mosul. A few days later, the first issue 
of Dabiq began appearing on selected websites, and it included quotes 
from the new caliph about various policies that first appeared on 
Twitter. Generally, commercial enterprises like Twitter and YouTube 
will remove such postings for violating content policies, but once 
posted they take on a life of their own on the Internet and can be found 
on a variety of public and private websites and blogs.  
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ii. ISIS Messaging 
ISIS messaging may be lurid and overwhelming, as in the 
beheading videos, or it may be subtle and intended for specific 
audiences. For example, the first issue of Dabiq devoted an article to 
establishing that leadership means both religious and political 
leadership for ISIS. The article’s title, “The Concept of Imamah 
(Leadership) Is From the Millah (Path) of Ibrahim” contains some 
allusions that resemble “dog whistles,” or phrases with special 
significance to specific audiences (just as dog whistles are pitched 
outside the range of human hearing, where only dogs can hear them—
and be trained to respond to them). For example, the statement that 
leadership is derived from the path or way of Ibrahim (Arabic for the 
Prophet Abraham) could simply mean that leadership derives from a 
Salafi jihadist concept of Islam, because that is what “Millah Ibrahim” 
means to jihadists. On the other hand, the path of Ibrahim could also 
allude to the other significant event announced in the magazine: the 
seizure of religious and political power by the new Caliph Ibrahim.  
The embedded dog whistle is more obscure; Millah Ibrahim is 
the title of an important book by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a famous 
jihadist religious authority and former mentor of al-Zarqawi. Al-
Maqdisi turned against al-Zarqawi because of the latter’s excessive and 
brutal violence and became an outspoken critic of ISIS. Citing this 
book is signaling to other jihadists, especially in Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan, that ISIS is claiming to have accomplished what al-Maqdisi had 
only spoken about. Furthermore, Dabiq’s apocalyptic messaging 
context would appeal to extremists in Saudi Arabia, who admire al-
Maqdisi’s works, tend toward a millenarian concept of history, and 
agree with his harsh criticism of the Saudi government.  
Dabiq contains other important indications of the ISIS group’s 
policies. For example, in describing the strategy of founder al-Zarqawi, 
the authors of Dabiq introduce the transliterated Arabic words nikayah 
(damage/terrorism), tawahhush (savagery or chaos), and tamkin 
(establishing the proto-state). These are ordinary words but are used as 
terms of art as the three stages of jihad in The Administration of 
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Savagery. The magazine also describes deals with tribal councils, part 
of a strategy developed by ISIS in its written plan for a comeback in 
Iraq in anticipation of the withdrawal of American forces, and mimics 
the American approach to Awakening Councils among the tribes in 
Iraq to decimate al Qaeda in Iraq. In the context of this strategy 
attributed to al-Zarqawi, ISIS outlines a five-stage roadmap it will 
follow to expand its proto-state. The first two stages constitute the 
recruitment and absorption of individuals or groups into the ISIS 
structure, while the last three stages echo the three-stage cycle of 
guerrilla warfare described by Naji and al-Suri.
43
 
The first stage is the call for recruits to travel (hijrah) to ISIS-
held areas in Syria/Iraq or other battlefields. The second stage is to join 
(jama’ah) the group and be trained and absorbed. The third stage is to 
engage in destabilizing the central government with terrorism and 
guerrilla warfare. The fourth stage is the establishment of the proto-
state after government forces are withdrawn or defeated—“the 
administration of savagery.” The final stage is the establishment of an 
Islamic emirate or, in the case of Syria/Iraq, the self-declared caliphate. 
 This sequence makes sense only if one considers that the 
expansion of the caliphate requires additional local and foreign recruits 
to be guided through the five-stage path. In Syria and Iraq, the process 
is mature and ISIS is fighting to survive, but in Egypt or Libya, to cite 
two active examples, the groups pledging allegiance to Caliph Ibrahim 
are in the beginning stages of the process. Anywhere ISIS exists, the 
stream of recruits is required to replenish its losses in its continuous 
armed struggle to establish its rule over new areas, consolidate those 
areas with previous conquests, and then continue to expand. Essentially 
unopposed, ISIS forces expanded rapidly in northern Iraq, subduing 
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village after village and setting up a primitive government under its 
own version of Islamic law. In Syria, however, ISIS was able to 
consolidate its rule in al-Raqqa and increase government services to the 
point where it can claim to have a number of government services one 
would expect in a city. The most dramatic consolidation of power was 
between contiguous areas in Iraq and Syria after Mosul fell to ISIS 
forces when central government forces fled. The areas under ISIS 
control, however, are not static. The greatest challenge for ISIS so far 
has been Kurdish forces in both Syria and Iraq supported by U.S. air 
assets, which have managed to defeat ISIS forces and drive it out of a 
number of previously occupied areas. Without a strong propaganda 
campaign to replenish its ranks, ISIS could not sustain its momentum 
or continue to hold areas it has taken by force. 
Space does not permit cataloging all the allusions and messages 
in the first issue of Dabiq, let alone all the messages in the following 
issues. Each page is carefully written and dense with messages framed 
for a variety of audiences that ISIS intends to reach, both friends and 
enemies. Even a casual reading of Dabiq demonstrates what one would 
expect from any jihadist group, that is, the holy places in Saudi Arabia 
and Jerusalem are high mission priorities. A careful reading shows that, 
like al Qaeda, the ISIS group’s doctrine follows in the Egyptian 
revolutionary intellectual tradition of Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad 
Abd al-Salam Faraj. This tradition places the modern concept of jihad 
as an individual obligation at the center of Islamic doctrine; considers 
all Muslims except for Salafi jihadists to be apostate; and downgrades 
Jews and Christians to the status of implacable enemies that are not part 
of the Abrahamic tradition.  
 
Discussion Questions  
1. Much of the ISIS group’s political propaganda involves the 
use of Islamic symbols and popular beliefs. How can the U.S. and its 
coalition allies counter this propaganda (for example, the use of the 
concept of the Apocalypse) without making matters worse? What 
would be the effect of ignoring this part of ISIS propaganda? 
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2. How important are Kurdish forces in the battle against ISIS 
in Iraq and Syria? Should the U.S. arm the Kurds directly, even if the 
governments of Iraq and Turkey object? In other words, how would 
you make the tradeoff between military gains against ISIS versus 
political complications with allies? 
3. What elements would you include in an information war 
against ISIS? 
 
B. Mobilization: Social Movement Theory Concepts Applied to 
ISIS 
Several concept pairs developed in Social Movement Theory 
complement the contextual analysis of ISIS’s general propaganda and 
its targeted usage of social media for recruitment. These concepts are 
useful tools in assessing an organization’s approach to mobilizing 
political forces behind its programs and provide the frameworks for 
questions concerning how an organization is successful in terms of its 
strengths and vulnerabilities. The first pair is culture and framing, in 
which organizations frame all issues in terms of the culture of the group 
it intends to influence. Framing can also be used to convert target 
populations to a political culture mobilized for action. Over time, how 
an organization frames issues becomes the political brand of that 
organization. The second concept pair is violence and contention. The 
interplay of violence and contention
44
 in the political realm defines how 
and when violence becomes the chosen form of political contention. 
The last concept pair to be considered is network and alliances. Here, 
the key is the distinction between the two and the identification of 
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including the various tools available to social movements to oppose the ruling 
system in a particular country or region. Social movements usually have a 
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when collaboration within a network is permitted under revolutionary 
Salafi jihadism, when an alliance is not permitted. 
 
i. Culture and Framing 
Perhaps the strongest aspect of the ISIS group’s mobilization 
strategy is its ability to frame its messages consistently and with cross-
references across multiple social media platforms. However, as Quintan 
Wiktorowicz argues in his groundbreaking book Islamic Activism, 
“One of the most critical dimensions of the framing process for 
movement mobilization is frame resonance.” 45  Like other Islamist 
recruiting efforts, ISIS frames messages with different cultural 
resonance for different audiences. And like other extremist groups 
before it, ISIS recruiters target individuals and groups with tailored 
appeals, purely political appeals, appeals to victimhood, religious 
appeals, appeals that offer a new identity, and apocalyptic appeals. The 
major overarching frames include the following: 
 Salafi jihadist answer to world problems (true Islam) 
 Fulfillment of end-times prophesies (apocalyptic 
adventure) 
 Answer to unjust U.S. and its client tyrants (caliphate 
as powerful winner) 
 Benign community of believers (paradise for lost 
millennials) 
 Avenger of racial and ethnic humiliation (revenge and 
rebirth for victims) 
 Best bet to survive (protector in war theaters) 
ISIS framing exercises will change with changing events. The 
vocabulary and symbols will vary with audience. These appeals may be 
single source or mixtures such as Dabiq offers. What is new and a 
                                                 
45
 Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 16. 
RYAN: ISIS—THE TERRORIST GROUP THAT WOULD BE A STATE 
58 
 
distinctive competitive advantage for ISIS is its ability to match the 
medium to the preferences of the target audience—in other words, it 
chooses the medium and message that resonates best with the target 
audience. In the case of recruitment, the framing may begin with a 
general framing on radical websites and Facebook using themes such as 
the alleged victimization of Muslims in wars the U.S. or its allies have 
fought. A general appeal using the usual framing of events in Iraq, 
Syria, or other areas with a majority Muslim population may be part of 
a broad radicalization effort. The appeal may be sharpened by Twitter 
offerings in English that target a young audience in a specific country. 
Finally, if individuals self-identify with specific concerns, ISIS 
operatives may target them with personal messages to their phones or 
email accounts to continue the radicalization process. These might be 
totally political in nature or may have a religious cast. Where 
conditions permit, recruiters may offer these messages in person in a 
way that may be protected by laws allowing freedom of speech. If the 
message is religious, the target will be someone who may identify as a 
Muslim but does not know much about Islam beyond clichés.  
The distinctive framing used by ISIS, which is different from 
all other radical groups currently, is its self-identification as the 
caliphate for all Muslims. One of its most powerful appeals to lost 
souls is its representation of its Syrian capital, al-Raqqa, as a peaceful 
community of believers where every race and ethnicity is treated with 
respect and given a purpose in a loving community of believers. This 
image remains powerful despite al-Raqqa’s grim reality. 
 
ii. Violence and Contention 
So until we return to the correct state of Islamic affairs, it’s 
upon us all to work together to eradicate the principle of “free 
choice,” and to not deceive the people in an attempt to seek 
their pleasure, neither by calling to “free choice” directly, nor 
by alluding to it indirectly. Rather, we must confront them 
with the fact that they’ve turned away from the religion, 
while we hold onto it, grasping its purity, its clarity, its 
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comprehensiveness, without any blemishes due to shirk 
[idolatry], misguidance or heresy, and that we’re completely 
ready to stand in the face of anyone who attempts to divert us 
from our commitment to making the religion of Allah 
triumphant over all other religions, and that we will continue 
to fight the people of deviation and misguidance until we die 
trying to make the religion triumphant.
46
 
In most political movements, the key question is how political 
contention is managed. The usual assumption is that denying any 
political space for opposition creates the conditions in which political 
violence is more likely. Furthermore, indiscriminate suppression of 
dissent is generally viewed as a mobilizing force for those who would 
engage in revolutionary activities. Some clandestine organizations in 
the Middle East and North Africa, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, 
inhabit a space that allows the pragmatic choice of violence or 
nonviolence depending on the circumstances. It is misleading to assert, 
however, that any Islamist group is inherently nonviolent. While Salafi 
jihadists are at the extreme of Islamist identity, there is no Gandhi or 
Martin Luther King in Islamist ranks. Jihadists argue that violence is 
always necessary in dealing with political foes. Occasionally, a Salafi 
jihadist will argue that violence must be avoided to prevent damage or 
destruction to the jihadist movement as a whole or in a particular 
country. In general, however, those making such statements generally 
make them in jail or after being released. The question for Salafi 
jihadists is not whether they will resort to violence—but against whom, 
when, and how. 
The quote above indicates an answer to the first two questions. 
ISIS is a modern totalitarian political movement based on a deviant 
Islamic analysis. It is a radical form of takfir (declaring someone to be 
an infidel) that is applied to all except those who accept the new 
caliphate. Therefore, violence is directed against anyone or any group 
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that disagrees with the group’s ideology. Similarly, the timing of 
violence against those who disagree is always until all dissent is 
crushed. It is an eternal war until the end times. The first ones who 
must be killed or converted are those who say they are Muslims but 
reject the truth that ISIS claims to be bringing to the world. The 
“Flood” alluded to in the theme of issue 2 of Dabiq is the great Flood 
that destroyed the entire world except for the Prophet Noah (called Nuh 
in Islam). 
The ISIS group’s practice of killing civilians and captive 
soldiers seems arbitrary and barbaric when viewed from the outside. 
Such violence is correctly recognized as primarily a terror tool and a 
recruiting vehicle. By killing those who resist, ISIS intends to 
encourage others to submit, an ancient practice that has precedents in 
Alexander the Great’s conquests, Caesar’s wars, and the Mongol 
invasion of the Middle East. However, when ISIS kills soldiers after 
they surrender or kills noncombatants, they discriminate between 
Sunnis, who are given a chance to repent and pledge allegiance to al-
Baghdadi, and Shia, who are executed. Shia are always framed as 
“rejectionists,” while Sunni are “apostates.” ISIS thus denies that it 
kills indiscriminately. 
Many question whether ISIS is more violent than al Qaeda or a 
greater threat to the U.S. In fact, most signature atrocities such as 
videos recording ritualized beheadings belong as much to al Qaeda’s 
repertoire as to ISIS. Al Qaeda has beheaded Western civilians on 
camera clandestinely in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to cite two 
examples. The leadership of al Qaeda thought these worked against its 
brand, but it is still possible to find video beheadings claiming to be by 
al Qaeda’s Jabhat Nusra in Syria today. Al Qaeda also has used suicide 
bombers against civilians in a number of countries. Certainly, al Qaeda, 
like ISIS, has been responsible for the deaths of more Muslims than 
non-Muslims in their numerous terror campaigns throughout the world.  
The more interesting comparison is between ISIS and the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria during the 1990s. GIA 
developed into one of the most radical and violent jihadist groups in 
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modern times, although its scope was local rather than transnational or 
global. In escalating waves of violence marked by the massacre of 
civilians, GIA eventually claimed that essentially all Algerians, except 
for their own members, were infidels meriting death. Even al Qaeda 
strategists al-Suri and Naji referred to the GIA as “deviant.” Professor 
Mohammad M. Hafez has argued that GIA’s anti-civilian violence in 
Algeria was “the outcome of an ill-fated convergence of three 
variables—indiscriminate repression, exclusive organization, and 
antisystem ideologies.”47 Hafez argued that the Algerian government, 
after a military coup that thwarted the legal election of an Islamist 
government and the defeat of the founding secular regime, resorted to 
indiscriminate violence to repress the protesting Islamist factions. This 
in turn allowed GIA, which was a marginal but highly exclusive and 
secretive group, to increase its membership, powered by powerful anti-
government framing. GIA eventually lost the support of a terrified 
populace and fell to the militarized government. It was this example 
that al-Zawahiri had in mind when he counseled al-Zarqawi against 
anti-Shia violence and why al Qaeda today is taking a stand against 
video beheadings. But GIA did not have the ISIS group’s powerful 
media tools.
48
 
In the face of other jihadist opposition, ISIS has turned video 
beheadings and even live burnings to its advantage, at least in the short 
term. What most people see as barbaric, a subset of radicalized 
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individuals sees as heroic acts of revenge and a sign of power against 
arrogant enemies. This short-term strength, however, may turn into a 
long-term vulnerability—but only if the U.S. and its allies can mount 
an effective counter narrative that rivals the effectiveness of ISIS 
propaganda. Otherwise, culturally framed violence will continue to be a 
significant tool in the ISIS arsenal. 
 
iii. Networks and Alliances 
The Islamic State has an extensive history of building relations 
with the tribes within its borders in an effort to strengthen the ranks of 
the Muslims, unite them under one imam, and work together towards 
the establishment of the prophetic Khilafah. Its practice of attending 
tribal forums, addressing the concerns of the tribal leaders, and 
accepting their bay’ah is regularly met with success. 
Last month, following instructions from the head of Public 
Relations in Wilayat Halab [Governorate of Aleppo], the 
wilayah’s head of Tribal Affairs attended a meeting with the 
following tribal representatives ... 
49
 
Clandestine groups, especially jihadist ones, operate within a 
shadow network that includes not only allies but also other groups that 
collaborate because of specific mutual advantage. When at its weakest 
point in 2009/2010 in Iraq, ISIS forged a strategy to strengthen its 
political position, at the core of that strategy was the recognition that 
the group’s treatment of Sunni tribes had created the circumstances in 
which the tribal leaders were ready to ally with the U.S. to destroy 
AQI. Winning over the Sunni tribes in Iraq was a large part of the ISIS 
reemergence in Iraq. Similarly, in Syria, gaining the cooperation of 
tribal groups is at the strategic core of the ISIS group’s tactical 
success.
50
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In the above quote, ISIS demonstrates how it succeeds with 
tribes by using a Syrian example, but the same scenario played itself 
out in Iraq as well. After the withdrawal of American forces, the Maliki 
government’s mistreatment of the Sunni tribes created a universal 
hostility among their ranks. ISIS needed to transform resentment, 
which could be passive, into active resistance. ISIS went about this 
transformation by both using political arguments and providing 
tangible rewards. The tangible rewards were delivered in the context of 
their proto-government, which is the equivalent of Naji’s 
Administration of Savagery in areas from which central government 
forces had been withdrawn in Iraq and Syria. These tangible benefits 
are succinctly described in Dabiq: 
 Returning property to owners 
 Investing millions of dollars in local services 
 Providing security and stability 
 Ensuring the availability of food and commodities in 
local markets 
 Reducing crime rate 
ISIS also reported what it expected from the tribes around 
Aleppo in return. It requested that tribal elders collect the religious tax 
(zakat) and prepare lists of orphans and widows who would benefit 
from the tax. Next, it asked the elders to “encourage” youth to join its 
military forces and turn in any weapon acquired either from the Assad 
regime or the Free Syrian Army. Finally, ISIS told the elders that any 
of its members who had borne arms against ISIS could repent; 
ominously, their repentance must occur before ISIS captured them.  
Recounting the meeting in Syria and other meetings, ISIS listed 
the names of those tribes attending. However, Dabiq becomes vague 
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when recounting the number of tribal leaders that pledged allegiance to 
al-Baghdadi and ISIS. The clear implication is that ISIS is accepting 
tribes’ buying into the ISIS network and collaborating without actually 
becoming part of it. One could say that the relationship is more than a 
network but less than an alliance, especially since ISIS has substituted 
wilayat (governorates or provinces) for allies. Naji wrote about “faith-
based bonds of loyalty” as a substitute for tribal loyalty, which he 
envied.
51
 This may be the model for ISIS seeking pledges of allegiance 
or bay’ah as a substitute for tribal bonds. In following this path, 
however, ISIS is vulnerable to tribal backlash and ultimately revolt 
under the same conditions that would allow such a course. 
We have discussed how ISIS relies on criminal networks and in 
many ways itself constitutes a criminal network of smugglers and 
extortionists. In addition to using criminal networks logistically, ISIS 
appears to contract out killing. For example, on one occasion when 
Kurdish forces in Iraq allowed reporters to interview captured ISIS 
killers, it became clear that the men were paid killers, not ISIS soldiers. 
The men referred to ISIS in the third person, using the pejorative term 
Dae’sh52 casually, as though it were the most ordinary way to refer to 
the group, although use of that term would be avoided by any ISIS 
member, even under duress. ISIS also networks with other hostile 
jihadist organizations with which it is in a state of perpetual war. Such 
networking is based on pragmatism and is the field commander’s 
prerogative. When al Qaeda groups in Syria occasionally collaborate 
with local ISIS forces in military operations, such collaboration does 
not signify that the two parent groups are considering reuniting. Unless 
the official spokesman announces a rapprochement or truce, any local 
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accommodations should be considered normal pragmatic field 
decisions without wider political ramifications.  
To counter the ISIS group’s mobilization strategy requires 
collaboration between Muslim-majority countries and the U.S. and its 
Western allies. ISIS has shown its resilience as a social movement and 
a revolutionary concept, so the collaboration against it must be long 
term. The U.S. cannot effectively counter the specifically religious 
aspects of the ISIS narrative because only Muslim authorities have any 
credibility in that arena. That is not to say that the U.S. government 
should not collaborate with private Muslim-American organizations, 
especially in anti-radicalization programs in Muslim communities. 
However, addressing issues such as the end-times narrative requires a 
deep knowledge of Islamic texts and traditions. Funding translations 
from Arabic is one important aspect of this struggle. While Western 
public figures often state that Middle Eastern Muslims must do more to 
counter radical statements, many Arabic voices are in fact raised but go 
unnoticed because of language barriers. The West should at least match 
the ISIS group’s translation efforts into major European languages. 
Otherwise, the ISIS narrative goes unchallenged in, for example, 
English-, French-, and German-speaking countries. 
Much of what the U.S. can do involves avoiding playing into 
the mobilization narrative and inadvertently feeding it. The most 
famous example is President George W. Bush’s use of “crusade” to 
describe American military actions. To avoid such gaffes, a great deal 
more effort needs to be placed on understanding the jihadist ideology. 
Much progress has been made, but much more effort is required. 
The importance of criminal networks to ISIS and al Qaeda 
argues for vigorous cooperation among coalition law enforcement 
agencies to disrupt these networks. Attacking crime in general will not 
help because the category is too broad, but putting organizations and 
individuals on notice that the international community will give high 
priority to arresting and prosecuting individuals who receive goods 
smuggled by ISIS operatives would be a significant positive step. 
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Discussion Questions 
1. ISIS uses “culture and framing” in much of its public 
dialogue via terms and arguments that resonate with the culture of its 
target audiences to criticize its enemies, including the United States. 
How could the U.S. frame ISIS attacks on historical and religious 
landmarks that are much loved by local populations in ways that would 
resonate in the greater Middle East? What would be the military’s role, 
if any, in this messaging? Can you think of other issues that would be 
more effective to reframe? 
2. What factors contribute to the success of ISIS on social 
media? What countermeasures are available to mitigate that success? 
3. ISIS uses networks of Sunni Arab tribes in Syria and Iraq to 
prosecute its war against the region. Much of its work with tribes was 
inspired by the successful U.S. strategy against al Qaeda insurgents 
during the “Surge” in Iraq. From your experience, could the U.S. 
replicate its work with Sunni tribes in present day Iraq and Syria 
without a large military footprint? Explain. 
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IV. Conclusion: Net Assessment of ISIS Strengths 
and Weaknesses With Recommendations 
 
As suggested earlier, this case study is intended to be a 
preliminary net assessment of the ISIS group’s strengths and 
weaknesses. To be useful, such a net assessment must take into account 
a relatively long time frame, which current trends suggest. What 
follows are conclusions gained from this assessment, with preliminary 
recommendations based on current research. 
 
A. The Enemy’s Strengths 
One of the greatest failures of the U.S. approach to ISIS 
mirrors a shortcoming with al Qaeda—namely, a failure to identify 
precisely who the enemy is and describe it in the terms it describes 
itself. This failure of concept stems from an attitude that is often heard 
in private conversation but not written down. Too often, analysis of 
ISIS and al Qaeda fails to recognize the importance of the written word 
to these groups. Both ISIS and al Qaeda are modern, adaptive learning 
organizations in spite of the primitive society they espouse, and their 
strategists and practitioners take great care in the written and spoken 
word. They produce written primers for recruits in grand strategy as 
well as strategic critiques of their own operations. 
ISIS follows in al Qaeda’s footsteps by having multifaceted 
strategies based on lessons learned from past failures and successes. 
We know that ISIS’s military strategy begins from a model that would 
be recognized by Mao, Che Guevara, or General Giap. It is a strategy 
that hopes to defeat the most powerful global military by using a 
political strategy aimed at convincing the U.S. that staying the course in 
the Middle East will be too costly in lives, treasure, and international 
prestige. And it intends to defeat local powers by a version of 
Clausewitz’s levée en masse using a mobilization strategy based on 
effective religiously-based propaganda, tangible rewards, and fearsome 
punishment. It has focused on the local themes that have always 
appealed to some groups within the Muslim majority of the greater 
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Middle East, including reestablishing a powerful caliphate, driving out 
foreign powers, protecting the sacred places of Islam, controlling the 
region’s natural energy resources, and, finally, producing a righteous 
version of social justice by overthrowing all authoritarian regimes. ISIS 
also enjoys the reputation of being the richest jihadist organization at 
present, capable of persuading citizens of some 80 countries to travel to 
join its struggle. In both Iraq and Syria, ISIS has managed to forge 
powerful relationships with Sunni tribes with grievances against Shia 
Muslim-majority governments. 
ISIS is part of a social movement that describes itself as the 
leader of the global Salafi jihadist community, similar to al Qaeda’s 
claim to be the vanguard of the Salafi jihadist movement. ISIS is 
attempting to become a mass unified social movement by 
demonstrating almost miraculous success in a short period of time in 
Iraq and Syria. It also has aspirations to support insurrections in the 
Arabian Peninsula, beginning with Saudi Arabia. Further afield, it has 
seeded nascent groups in the Sinai, Libya, Algeria, and the Af/Pak 
region. In addition, the well-established Boko Haram group has 
pledged allegiance to ISIS. 
 
B. The Enemy’s Weaknesses 
Despite its quick success, ISIS is not militarily strong in a 
conventional sense. It has no defense against American and coalition 
airstrikes. It has not been successful over the long run against 
determined Kurdish ground forces in either Iraq or Syria. Its rapid 
initial success is based on a superior guerrilla strategy coupled to its 
ability to terrorize its opposition; this initial success must be sustained, 
but holding territory is proving more difficult over the long run. 
Similarly, over the long run ISIS will need to continue to generate large 
amounts of revenue to sustain its operations. It will inevitably give 
priority to its military operations, which will raise discontent among its 
subject Sunni population who accede to ISIS not out of love, but 
because of grievances against the Shia. However, it appears unlikely 
that ISIS will be able to generate the revenue it needs. American 
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“strategic patience” in its air campaign is paying dividends by reducing 
ISIS revenues from petroleum smuggling and other criminal 
enterprises. Furthermore, its enemies among the Gulf nations have 
taken steps to stem donations from private sources.  
One of the strategic hinge issues is the internal war among 
local jihadist groups. While ISIS has emerged as the most powerful 
group in terms of resources and ability to draw new members, it is 
weakened by its unwillingness to achieve a meaningful detente with al 
Qaeda and other jihadist groups despite its claim to the caliphate. ISIS 
would be strengthened by such a detente, but it seems highly unlikely 
in the short or long term. The barbaric public atrocities that have 
somehow inspired foreigners to travel to join ISIS have, at the same 
time, undermined its brand in the Middle East with the vast majority of 
Muslims in the most powerful countries. Finally, to succeed, ISIS 
needs to live up to its slogan “remaining and expanding.” If it can be 
contained or rolled back in the territories it occupies, it could lose its 
advantage of being seen as a winner worthy of fear, if not respect. 
 
C. Recommendations 
The following recommendations are based on information 
provided in this case study. Where direct U.S. military involvement is 
suggested, this is always intended to be a limited, mission-specific 
involvement such as the use of temporary direct action by Special 
Forces or air strikes. Such recommendations should not be understood 
to mean a massive involvement of conventional forces at the level of 
U.S. involvement in Afghanistan or Iraq. 
 
i. Counterterrorism Recommendations 
On balance, the competition between al Qaeda and ISIS is a 
zero-sum game: the U.S. cannot degrade one without strengthening the 
other. However, the counterterrorism and police measures used against 
ISIS can be adapted to degrade al Qaeda as well. For example, 
measures taken against an ISIS smuggling network would also affect al 
Qaeda capabilities. To address the ancient issue of smuggling requires 
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the use of all the tools at the U.S. coalition’s disposal in the areas of 
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and counter narrative. 
Importantly, American operations need to be executed in the context of 
a clear strategy, including publicly articulated and resourced goals and 
objectives. As it is unrealistic to expect to stop all smuggling into and 
out of Syria and Iraq, any anti-smuggling effort would need to 
discriminate between high-priority and low-priority targets. For 
example, coalition forces and intelligence assets could decide to target 
high-value operations such as smuggling of people, arms, petroleum 
products, and historical artifacts. The U.S. also would need to give 
clear warnings that individuals engaging in such smuggling are 
considered to be members of ISIS, not innocent civilians.  
U.S. counterterrorism resources include police, intelligence 
agencies, and the military. These efforts are both domestic and foreign 
and include a coalition of allies. In a successful campaign against ISIS, 
allied efforts are crucial, particularly in countries where jihadists rally 
to the ISIS banner. Fortunately, this coalition is already in place and, at 
one level or another, the U.S. works with countries sharing a 
counterterrorism interest. The U.S. can greatly strengthen 
counterterrorism efforts by providing technical assistance to our allies, 
especially in forensic science and intelligence, two fields in which 
American technology is paramount. The key to success is sharing 
information among components and resourcing the analysis of data. 
Each country in the coalition must be responsible for its own 
enforcement; problems will always arise around data that is not shared. 
Counterinsurgency theory and practice has risen and fallen 
over the last decade. There has been controversy concerning whether al 
Qaeda and ISIS should be addressed as a counterterrorism or a 
counterinsurgency problem set. Despite the hot political aspects of this 
debate, a cold eye on the nature of ISIS and al Qaeda reveals that both 
organizations are promoters and participants in transnational 
insurgencies and use terrorism as a major weapon. To be effective in 
the current atmosphere, the U.S. can make headway in 
counterinsurgency by using military and intelligence means against 
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perceived ISIS strengths. For ISIS, legitimacy is based on success. By 
thwarting success, the U.S. and its allies can degrade the group’s brand 
and its legitimacy. To cite one example, ISIS financial strength allows 
it to fund groups like Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) in the Sinai. ABM 
has suffered severely under the Egyptian military campaign against it, 
but it has been able to improve its operations by declaring allegiance to 
ISIS. Being able to fund and arm groups like this is an important part of 
what gives ISIS legitimacy in the eyes of ABM members and other 
jihadist groups with ambitions of their own, whether in Libya, Algeria, 
or the Sahel.  
Finally, a key component is the need to put the occasional ISIS 
success in context. For example, it is not enough to note that ISIS uses 
classic guerrilla warfare strategy that relies on the media and 
propaganda as much as on force of arms. The U.S. and its coalition 
allies need to use that knowledge to note that when ISIS forces lose 
ground in one area, their small-unit tactics using multiple suicide-
vehicle-borne IEDs and their ability to move quickly allows them to 
mount successful surprise attacks. These attacks are “successful” if 
they manage to distract the media from recent coalition success on a 
wider scale and portray ISIS success as a change in momentum. 
Nevertheless, ISIS will not be able to hold the territory if coalition 
forces mount a determined counterattack. 
From the beginning of its involvement, the U.S. has prioritized 
air strikes on economic targets within ISIS-held territory. Significantly 
increasing these strikes could over time degrade this source of 
legitimacy. Meanwhile all the local counterinsurgency efforts would 
remain the responsibility of local forces, ideally using subnational 
forces that possess a strong unity of purpose, with U.S. technical 
assistance and training. In locales such as Syria, Iraq, Libya, and 
Yemen, the U.S. may not be able to rely solely on local forces in the 
immediate and mid term. U.S. and coalition military forces tailored to 
the situation may need to be part of the military solution in such cases, 
whether through an air campaign or through ground forces at a level 
well below that of either the Iraq or Afghan wars. 
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ii. Counter Narrative Recommendations 
Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency programs need a 
counter narrative to transform operational success into political success. 
Like any effective political narrative, the anti-ISIS narrative must be 
composed of positive information about the coalition as well as 
negative information about ISIS. To be credible, both must be fact-
based and consistent with the evidence. Posting accurate date online 
and using social media to lead individuals to that data could be 
powerful tools. However, such programs cannot be identified as a 
psychological operations campaign. They need to be part of an 
information campaign with high standards of accuracy and 
international credibility, delivered via all modern social media as well 
as traditional media. For example, if a nongovernmental group were to 
tabulate and update atrocities that ISIS itself claims, such a database 
could be an effective resource for journalists and others. The database 
would need to be timely and constantly available. While various NGOs 
and think tanks currently track ISIS activities that experts use 
piecemeal, creating an online clearinghouse for this work could be a 
useful first step for the U.S. government or a privately funded effort. 
This approach could be difficult in its start-up phase. But 
without reliable public information, the counter narrative war on ISIS 
likely cannot be won—if winning means reducing the threat to the 
international order to acceptable levels by stopping the spread of 
jihadist cells across the globe and discrediting the ideology that spawns 
them. 
One conclusion to be drawn from al-Suri’s analysis of the 
lessons learned in the Muslim Brotherhood’s failed Syrian insurrection 
is that the sensitive pressure points for a jihadist group like ISIS 
become clear. The greatest successes by ISIS in this regard suggest the 
potential for their greatest vulnerabilities to be exploited. For example, 
if the U.S. were to force ISIS into a war of attrition beginning with 
areas adjacent to or in Kurdish territories, essentially to achieve some 
strategic depth for the Kurds, we could damage more than the resultant 
military losses might suggest. Such an operation would begin to erode 
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ISIS’s propaganda advantage, attacking the basis of its consistent 
propaganda slogan of “remaining and expanding” by demonstrating 
that ISIS cannot expand into Kurdish-declared no-go zones. One could 
make the same case for Sunni Arab tribes in Iraq and Syria. To succeed 
in this effort, the U.S. would need to lead the coalition in significantly 
arming and training Kurdish forces and Sunni Arab tribes directly, 
based on best military estimates of requirements. Political objections to 
such a course by local governments constitute a serious obstacle to 
direct efforts with subnational groups; but for the U.S. to continue to 
heed such objections would be nothing less than giving up a powerful 
tool with a record of success. 
The U.S. would also need to enhance its tactical air campaign 
considerably while maintaining its current strategic campaign against 
economic targets. As this program becomes successful, the U.S. could 
work with the Iraqi Army to pursue similar campaigns against 
geographically significant targets held or under attack by ISIS, before 
eventually turning to a campaign to retake Mosul. We could then 
simultaneously declare the creation of coalition expeditionary quick-
strike units, including U.S. Special Forces and Marines, and proceed 
with quick temporary strikes inside Iraq and eventually Syria at 
strategic points. This would clearly demonstrate that ISIS is not a state 
and cannot protect the territory it now holds.  
These military moves would not be meaningful without an 
accompanying and coordinated strategic narrative. The narrative would 
have two parts. In the first part, Muslim coalition partners (Egypt 
would need to be a part of this campaign) would start a sustained 
campaign against the Islamic pretentions and arguments broadcast by 
ISIS. This campaign would include technical religious arguments 
offered by recognized religious authorities. These arguments would not 
be difficult to construct, but they would need to be sustained and not 
abandoned when they become subject to counterattacks by ISIS and its 
jihadist sympathizers.  
The second aspect of this counter narrative campaign would 
focus on the basic fallacy at the heart of the ISIS group’s strategy, 
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beginning with the strategic flaw of trying to hold territory in the center 
of Muslim lands without any allies, economy of its own, or strategic 
advantage. This campaign could also focus on the non-religious aspects 
of a state. Such attacks already exist in Arabic on Christian Arab 
websites and argue that the Islamic State is a state without borders, 
without recognition from any state, without the ability to defend itself, 
without an economy outside of criminal enterprises, without any 
foreign embassies, and so on. In short, the political counter narrative 
would need to be basic, straightforward, and relentless in all forms of 
media. The U.S. could lead this, but through a public-private 
partnership that would engage the creative energies of the private 
sector—coordinated and supported but not dictated by the government. 
Such a campaign would need to include Muslim-American groups and 
collaboration with Middle Eastern partners as much as feasible. 
 
iii. Final Recommendations 
The most important task for U.S. planners is to focus on how 
ISIS is carrying out its doctrine and strategy, to identify how it is 
adapting to U.S. pressure, and how it views victory as an organization. 
Most of the elements needed to defeat ISIS are in place. The American 
military has spoken of “strategic patience” to explain the slow, some 
would say cautious, pace of operations. The coalition’s emphasis on 
hitting economic targets is gradually paying dividends by first slowing 
and then significantly reducing the ISIS group’s revenue from 
petroleum sales and other criminal activities. Local populations have on 
occasion indicated to reporters that they recognize and appreciate the 
coalition’s focus on avoiding civilian casualties during airstrikes. 
Airstrikes against targets of opportunity in the open have reduced the 
ISIS group’s ability to mass forces against vulnerable targets or 
reinforce its own units when they come under attack in Iraq.  
In the endgame, the U.S. will need to reconsider its policy of 
not using forward spotters for precision airstrikes in cities and towns. 
When coalition fighters first struck targets in al-Raqqa, local residents 
reported that ISIS fighters fled the city. However, we should expect that 
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after experiencing the coalition’s policy of restraint, ISIS would 
continue to hide among the population in large cities, especially Mosul, 
to impede Iraqi or Kurdish forces. Placing U.S. Special Forces or 
Marines with allied ground forces would greatly assist clearing 
operations. The obvious problems with such a decision are the 
likelihood of American casualties and the perception that Americans 
and Iranian forces are fighting together against the Sunni population. 
While American military involvement in Iraq and Syria is 
important to contain ISIS, it is insufficient to defeat ISIS or al Qaeda 
over the long run. Another key part of coalition success is to continue 
to focus on first containing and then reversing ISIS, not only on the 
ground but also in its crucial advantage in communications and 
propaganda. The U.S. would reap benefits from continuing to target 
ISIS communications facilities and finding ways to wage cyber war 
against its online propaganda servers.  
Even more important than attacking physical aspects of ISIS 
communications, the U.S. and its allied coalition need to develop a 
multi-tiered counter narrative. The U.S. may encourage Muslim-
majority allies to consistently address the religious aspects of ISIS 
communications. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have a large role to play in 
this, and their efforts should be encouraged and supported technically. 
A joint fusion center to produce translations of statements and fatwas of 
major Muslim religious scholars or statements by recognized Islamic 
institutions would ensure that non-Arabic speakers hear rebuttals to the 
ISIS group’s multilingual output. For its part, the U.S. response should 
be crafted as though it were a high-quality political or advertising 
campaign against a rival, using classic opposition research and reports 
that are factual and convincing, not polemical. Providing reports to the 
international press with fact-checked statistics on ISIS crimes, its 
destruction of mosques and beloved historical landmarks, its 
involvement in human trafficking, and so on could inform a widely 
dispersed population of events about which they are now unaware. 
Information confirmed and reported by local press sources would likely 
be more effective than statements by American officials. 
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While difficult, defeating ISIS militarily could well prove the 
easiest part of the struggle. Unless the U.S. and its partners also 
succeed in discrediting its ideology, we should expect current trends to 
continue until either the movement burns itself out or local populations 
somehow manage to destroy it—neither of which is guaranteed. The 
anti-ISIS coalition thus must fashion cost-effective strategies to contain 
ISIS militarily while working together to discredit its legitimacy. The 
overarching premise of the American response should be that ISIS is a 
long-term violent threat of a hostile transnational social movement, 
wrapped in a Salafi jihadist cover. Comparisons to historical 
movements, such as the Anarchist movement before World War I, 
could be used to show how transnational violence begets more violence 
and does not build healthy societies. History has shown that we should 
expect the ISIS/al Qaeda phenomenon to reconstitute itself under a new 
name and new leadership in the event we manage to destroy its current 
organization and top leadership. As long as their ideas remain credible 
and even appealing to some, the threat of anarchistic violence will 
remain. 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. This case study lists some ISIS strengths and weaknesses. 
How would you characterize the ISIS group’s greatest strengths and 
greatest weaknesses?  
2. In your opinion, which of the recommendations in this case 
study are the most useful? Which are the least useful? What other 
countermeasures could the U.S. take against ISIS?  
3. Should the U.S. continue to target al Qaeda forces in Syria? 
Explain. 
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analyzed a week’s worth of IS official media releases. It found that the 
majority of IS social media output covers military activities, trainings 
and attacks, governance, preaching, moral policing and morality. The 
study also revealed that the group tends to rely on imagery more than 
words, especially highlighting the beauty of its territories.  
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